THIS COULD BE THE START OF SOMETHING BIG: LINKING EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES WITH SUBSEQUENT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN A CROSS-AGENCY COLLABORATION

Steven Kelman
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
steve_kelman@harvard.edu

Sounman Hong
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government

DRAFT ONLY
PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION

Presented at the
2012 APPAM Fall Research Conference
November 8-10, 2012
Baltimore, Maryland

It is commonplace in many of the social sciences to argue that events or choices early in the history of a nation, a social phenomenon, or an organization can influence what happens to the entity decades or even centuries later. The European countries that are predominantly Protestant today are those whose kings became Protestant during the Reformation. Germany's experience during the hyperinflation of the 1920's influenced German public opinion and government behavior in the nation's response to the crisis in the Eurozone almost a hundred years later. Allison (1971) presents the proposition that t+1=t is a basic feature of organization behavior, meaning that if one seeks to understand an organization's actions today, it is important to know what it was at an earlier time.

Such observations appear in a number of social science classics, not surprising given its early connection to the study of history. Marx begins The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1951: 224, originally published 1869) with the statement:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weights like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

Weber, in Methodology of Social Sciences (1949: 171,183) notes that a different outcome of the Battle of Marathon between Athens and Persia would have increased the odds of an eventual development of a "theocratic-religious" culture in the West by creating "'loaded' dice" favoring one kind of civilization over another. More recently, arguments about the "shadow of the past" on the present have been made in so many fields -- political science, organizational sociology, economics, even business history -- that David (2001: 15) suggests they represent a quest for a "historical social science."[1]

---

[1] In a short paper directed to organizational scholars, Lawrence (1984) draws a distinction between "historical research" and a "historical perspective." "Using written documents and artifacts to study

The basic causal mechanism posited in all this varied work is the same: "[S]ome initial event or process generates a particular outcome, which is then reproduced through time <u>even though the original generating event or process does not recur</u>" (Pierson 1994: 45, emphasis in original). Thus, there occurs persistence of the original behavior without recurrence of the original cause (Stinchcombe 1968). The behavior that has been established earlier on gets institutionalized: "persistence is not dependent…upon recurrent collective mobilization," and the behavior continues unless something disrupts its continuation (Jepperson 1991: 145).

The term used to describe the shadow of the past has varied in different disciplines; political scientists have referred to "critical junctures" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), organizational sociologists to "organizational imprinting." However, those using this kind of reasoning from many disciplines have increasingly come to use the expression "path dependence," which was coined in a famous paper by the economic historian Paul David (1985) describing -- of all things -- persistence in use of the QWERTY keyboard even after the original reason for it had disappeared, and when its continued use was in fact dysfunctional.

In this paper we examine the influence of early history on later outcomes in the context of a cross-organizational collaboration established in 1999 with the aim of reducing crime. In particular, we examine the influence of early managerial choices these collaborations' first leaders made on the crime performance of the collaboration a decade later. Our basic finding is that initial choices about how to promote collaboration

---

attitudes during the Depression" exemplifies the former, while "using historical information about the Depression to explain differences in attitudes today" exemplifies the latter.

among the different member organizations establish a better or worse pattern of early collaboration that then tends to persist many years later.

Public administration has been notable by its absence among social science traditions producing research on path dependence, an example of problems the field has with insufficient connection to other social science research (Kelman 2007). We thus seek in this paper to direct attention of public administration scholars to this strand of research, and provide an example of its relevance to improving government performance.

The empirical location of this research is Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP's), an interagency collaboration in British local government established by the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, and required in every local government area in England and Wales.[2] They consist mostly of government agencies – police (which are autonomous from local government), the Probation Service (a central government agency working with released prisoners), the Youth Offending Service (a central agency dealing with young people at risk of crime), the Fire Service (an autonomous local agency), local government service units (e.g., streetlighting, parks, and inspection services).[3] CDRP's frequently organize initiatives the CDRP runs itself. They are responsible for recommending so-called "anti-social behavior orders," restrictions on disruptive people (mostly youth) establishing limitations on others with whom or streets where they may congregate. Some CDRP's run "warden" programs; wardens, who have no arrest powers, patrol neighborhoods to provide additional presence and learn more about problems, as well as checking (and informing other agencies about) graffiti or lights with dead bulbs. Other examples of CDRP-run programs include collaborations

---

[2] A CDRP's boundaries are co-terminous with those of the local government.
[3] Some other organizations, often the voluntary sector, are often asked to join. CDRP's are not required to include organizations dealing with social problems such as unemployment.

between police and regulatory agencies against illegal liquor purchases, police/ probation programs to watch "prolific" offenders, and efforts involving police, streetlighting (in charge of surveillance cameras), and other agencies to target crime hot spots.

CDRP's provide a rare opportunity to examine whether there are relationships between how a collaboration is managed and its performance, such as the one we explore here between early organizational choices and later success. First, by statute they exist everywhere in England and Wales, so there are enough for quantitative analysis. Second, they aim to reduce crime, and crime data are available.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Path dependence approaches in the social sciences

Probably the largest body of social science research on the influence of early history on current outcomes has been done by political scientists and sociologists working in a tradition that has come to be known as "historical institutionalism" (Pierson 1994).[4] Perhaps the first example was Hartz's argument (1955) that the founding conditions of American society, in particular the lack of feudalism, had important implications extending to the present. With no strong central government needed to beat back feudalism, government became weaker and less prestigious; with no hereditary aristocracy, class lines became less-pronounced. Lipset's The First New Nation (1963) argued that early American values emphasizing achievement (out of the Puritan tradition) and equality (out of the revolutionary tradition) produced a society where success was both valued and open to everyone, such that later American society put more emphasis on achieving success regardless of the means used to achieve it, compared with many

---

[4] Interestingly, and reflecting the stance of mainstream historians that they are not a social science, very little work of this sort has been done by actual historians.

European societies where people were supposed to act in ways appropriate to their station in society. Lipset argued this explains, among other things, America's historically high crime rate, as well as the puzzling facts that, while American labor unions were politically more conservative than their European counterparts, they have been more likely to go on strike and use violence. Lipset also posited the path by which the past influenced the present, stating (1963: 7) that "key historical events…set one process in motion in one country and a second in another.. …In other words, historical events established values and predispositions, and these in turn determine later events."

Of more recent work in this tradition, perhaps the most-influential is Putnam's work on Italy (1993), which argued that differences in the independence of cities from monarchs in the Italian north and south dating back to eleventh-century created initial differences in levels of civic engagement that produced differences in levels of social capital, which in turn produced further growth of social capital and also, eventually, promoted better-functioning government institutions; Putnam found (1993: 151) almost perfect correlations -- .93 and .86 – in scatterplots measuring civic engagement at the regional government level in 1860 and 1970, and civic engagement in 1860 and government performance during the 1980's. (Other examples in this tradition, applied to Europe and Latin America respectively, are Ertman 1997 and Collier and Collier 1991; for economic policy in different countries Hall and Taylor 1996.)

Significant work in political science theory is also based on the view that early choices can explicitly be structured to influence later ones. One may read Moe's argument (1995) that legislators structure new agencies at the time of establishment in ways that increase the likelihood the agency will "continue generating benefits for their

creators in the future" (p. 124) as a claim that early choices are made with the aim of influencing later results; indeed, all theories about pre-commitment mechanisms in the design of political institutions, such as constitutionalism and central bank independence (Barro and Rogoff 1983; Rogoff 1985) may be seen in a similar way.

This perspective has been applied to organizations as well. Stinchcombe (1965) argued organizations tended to continue to bear many structural traces of the period they were founded long afterwards, a view that has become known, although Stinchcombe didn't use the expression, as "organizational imprinting." Would European labor parties be as influenced by Marxism, or the YMCA as a community center as influenced by Christianity, Stinchcombe asked, had they been founded around the time he was writing rather than a hundred years earlier?[5]

This approach has been pursued by some business historians. Boeker (1988) found that chip firms founded early, which sold mostly to the Defense Department, developed large R&D capabilities in order to satisfy their predominant customer's needs, while those founded later, selling to commercial markets, developed better capabilities at manufacturing and cost control; both these early differences persisted later on. Baron, Hannan & Burton (1999) found that high-tech firms whose founders had an initial allegiance to a "commitment model" emphasizing nurturing, employee selection based on cultural fit, and peer control had lower percentages of administrative staff six years later than did firms whose founders had an initial commitment to a "bureaucracy model" emphasizing employee selection based on role qualifications and formalized control.[6] Marquis and Huang (2010) found that early state laws allowing state banks to set up

---

[5] In the fifty years since Stinchcombe wrote, both organizations have become considerably less influenced by these founding features than they were when he wrote, a reminder of the limits of path dependence.
[6] This was so independently of whether the founder was still the CEO at the later point.

branches statewide created organizational capabilities for managing dispersed outlets that, when interstate banking became possible many decades later, increased the propensity of banks in those states to make acquisitions of out-of-state banks compared with banks in states that did not allow statewide branching. Attention to quantity of output rather than cost-control or product quality characterized what Kriauciunas and Kale (2006) call "socialist imprinting," and affected firms founded under communism in central and eastern Europe after these countries transitioned to market economies.

As in political science, significant parts of organization theory use the idea that early history influences later events without specifically invoking historical language. Any theory highlighting the importance of organizational inertia – be it organizational population ecology theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977) or theories emphasizing the difficulties of organizational change (Kelman 2005) – is in effect arguing that the past is importance for the present, even if the argument isn't stated this way. The same may be said for the theory (Selznick 1957) of institutionalization of organizational practices.

Path dependence, so widely discussed in other social science literatures, has received little attention in public administration. Some older work in organization studies on the influence of the past on later periods, dating from a time when organization scholars were more likely to study public organizations, are situated in government or non-profits. Thus Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots (1949) discusses the long-term impact of early decisions by the Tennessee Valley Authority to involve local farm organizations in governance, noting (p. 257) "the tendency of established relations and procedures to persist and extend themselves," thus "committing the organization to greater involvement than provided for in the initial decision to act." A paper (Kimberly

1975) involving not-for-profit sheltered workshops found that those started during an earlier period, where production was the dominant approach, were decades later significantly more likely to have a production orientation than those begun later, when rehabilitation was dominant. Meyer and Brown (1977) found local government finance bureaus started after the era of civil service reform were more likely, decades later, to use merit-system procedures in hiring staff than those that had been founded before civil service reform. We have been able to locate only a single paper by public administration scholars making an argument of this type. Johnston et al (2011) study a collaborative program involving non-profits and government agencies for nurse visits to low-income mothers; they argue early patterns of collaboration were important for explaining effectiveness many years later. The paper, however, cites no path dependence literature.

The Mechanisms of Path Dependence

The basic mechanisms creating path dependence involve positive feedback (David 1985; Pierson 1994; Jervis 1997), where early development "sets in motion reinforcing pressures that produce further change in the same direction" (Jervis 1997:125). The QWERTY story is that once the keyboard spread, typists were trained to type using that configuration, a learning investment that was expensive to reverse.

Not all the mechanisms discussed in literature on path dependence are relevant to the influence of the early choices of a cross-organizational collaboration on later performance, so we focus on those that might. In particular, we discuss three: (1) norm generation (2) capabilities generation, and (3) behavior amplification.

Norm Generation

Social norms are expectations an individual experiences about expected behavior or attitudes, or both. In the case of a CDRP, a behavioral norm might be for partners to cooperate (or not to cooperate), accompanied by an attitudinal norm of cooperativeness (or non-cooperativeness) among members. There might also be a norm about the level of legitimacy to accord the CDRP as an organization, and hence how much to take the wishes of the CDRP as a body into account.

Behaving, or believing, based on norms is one technique people use to economize on scarce cognitive processing resources. Thus, one way early choices might influence later results is by launching norms that partners should (or shouldn't) cooperate.

When a new organization such as a CDRP gets started, norms are up for grabs, because group norms are likely to be weak or non-existent (Tuckman 1965) Early choices can generate positive feedback loops later creating norms through two mechanisms, availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974) and social influence.

"Availability" refers to the ease with which something comes to mind. Tversky and Kahneman provide experimental evidence we believe things that are more available are also more common. For example, if you ask people whether the letter K is more common as first letter or third letter of words, most will say K as a first letter is more common, when in fact K is more common as the third letter; it is easier to remember examples of words beginning with K than with K as the third letter.[7]

This research, though intended to illuminate probability estimates about event occurrence, may be applied to development of norms. Tversky and Kahneman do note (1973: 228) that ideas of the future are shaped by experience of the past, because this is

[7] "Anchoring," another heuristic Tversky and Kahneman discuss (1974: 1128; see also Mussweiler and Strack 1999), may be seen analogously as a mechanism influencing judgments, by creating a starting point "that is adjusted to yield the final answer," typically, experiments show, close to the initial anchor point.

more available than that not experienced. Additionally, however, when we think about the influence of earlier events in a nation's history on later social values – say the influence of America's birth in a revolt against government authority making U.S. values more anti-statist compared with countries such as China where a strong state historically served as a protection against chaos – one may think of past experiences making certain values more available to later generations. More generally, past events may influence future behavior because if you have done something before, it is more available to influence future behavior. In this way, past events serve as an anchor for guiding interpretation of new information. The influence of availability creates positive feedback loops, as repetition makes a behavior increasingly available, finally generating a norm.

The second mechanism by which early choices may eventually generate norms is social influence, one of the most-studied phenomena in social psychology (Festinger et al 1950; Homans 1974). [8] As more people behave a certain way, there can be an accumulation of new adopters whose actions are based on social influence from earlier ones, creating the possibility of behavioral cascades (Bikhchandani et al 1992). Note, however, that, when the behavior in question initially is uncommon, social influence can operate to create positive feedback only if there is an underlying significant level of silent support for the behavior, held back by behavior inhibitors such as riskiness or worry about free riding – a phenomenon used to explain the spread of protests in dictatorships, as it becomes successively less risky to participate due to strength in numbers, bringing in people with successively greater risk aversion (Granovetter 1978). For a CDRP, low

[8] These are versions of "adaptive expectations" as a driver for path dependence in economic systems (Arthur 1988).

initial cooperative behavior despite fairly widespread pro-cooperation attitudes might be due to worries about free riding, which would progressively diminish as fewer free ride.

Scholars have used different constructs to characterize the hold of norms, which may be loosely rank-ordered in order of strength, according to which a norm is: (1) "taken for granted" (Garfinkel 1967); (2) subject to a "logic of appropriateness" rather than a "logic of consequentiality" (March and Olsen 2006); (3) "institutionalized" (Selznick 1957). All embody different degrees of legitimacy a norm creates for a behavior or attitude, or for an organization.

When a norm is "taken for granted," it has "simply become ingrained in… regular thought and practice by virtue of operating in such an environment for a long time." (Kriauciunas and Kale 2006: 669) "[T]o the extent that some form of substantive content…was used to justify the initial generalized legitimacy judgment…, this content… dissipates because it is no longer needed." (Tost 2011)

Somewhat stronger, a "logic of appropriateness" adds an element of prescription or even injunction to the situation where a behavior is simply taken for granted. March and Olsen (2006: 690) suggest: "Humans maintain a repertoire of roles and identities, each providing rules of appropriate behavior in situations for which they are relevant. …To act appropriately is to proceed according to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity. …" (p. 690) Lastly, Selznick (1957: 17, emphasis in original) uses "institutionalization" to refer to a situation where an organization's structure becomes over time "<u>infuse[d] with value</u> beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand," so the feature becomes "prize[ed] for its own sake." A similar argument, involving the hold of rules an organization had earlier developed on the individual employee, appears in

Merton (1968) 253, 256). To increase the chance employees pay attention to obeying the rules, organizations try "infusing group participants with appropriate attitudes and sentiment" toward them. But gradually "[a]dherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself."

Capabilities Generation

A "learning curve" (Argote 1999) refers to a situation where the unit cost of producing something declines as more is produced. As people and organizations get practice behaving a certain way, they move down the learning curve, and doing the behavior becomes easier, compared with a new behavior one might later try for the first time.[9] Hackman (2011: 61) cites a study showing that 73% of airline accident incidents occurred the first time an airline crew was flying together. Although the downward slope does not last indefinitely, while an organization is moving down a learning curve, there is positive feedback: continuing a behavior becomes progressively easier over time.

How does building initial capability create path dependency? If an organization is choosing between behaving two ways at a future date – call them "early way" and "later way" -- it will be relatively more attractive to behave in "early way," because the capability to behave that way is already developed, while the one to behave in "later way" needs to be developed from scratch. Additionally, the knowledge, skills, and training of organizational members embedded in "early way" creates a lobby inside the organization for "early way," because "new way" would require members to learn new knowledge and skills. (For business firms it is sometimes argued -- e.g. O'Reilly and Tushman 2008 -- that a firm's earlier business creates an interest group lobbying against

[9] "Learning effects" are one of the four mechanisms Arthur (1988) discusses as sources of path dependence in economics.

resources going into new businesses, especially when these would cannibalize existing sales, as for example with Kodak investments in digital camera technology.[10])

A lobby for behavioral continuity, via an organization's capabilities, is also created when the organization continues to promote and hire people upholding its early skills or values, or to replicate the values through socialization of new employees (Stinchcombe 1968).[11] Early organization leaders may also establish organizational rituals, or even rules, that replicate early values: principles established for the optical company Carl Zeiss when it was put under the ownership of a foundation directed the firm to emphasize product development based on scientific research (Becker 2012). Early leaders may also teach, in a master-apprentice fashion, their values to successors.

Behavior Amplification

Behaviors undertaken early in an organization's history may become amplified over time into larger behaviors, through operation of what is called "foot in the door," where "inducing people to take initial small, seemingly inconsequential steps [puts them] along a path that ultimately will lead them to take much larger and more consequential actions" (Ross and Nisbett, l99l: 50).[12] In a field experiment (Freedman and Fraser 1966), people were dramatically more likely to be willing to place a large, crudely lettered

[10] This is analogous to a mechanism often argued to create path dependence, particularly in political science literature (e.g. Selznick 1949; Verba 1971; Hacker 1998), the idea that early choices create interest groups lobbying against later changes that might reduce their power, perpetuating initial choices. Hacker, for example, argues that emergence of employment-tied health insurance systems around World War II, promoted by a decision in1942 to provide such plans favorable tax treatment, created a private health insurance industry that had an important political influence on subsequent debates about health care reform, inhibiting government-centered solutions that might reduce the role of the private insurance industry.

[11] Additionally, those newly hired who don't fit into early-established values may differentially leave the organization (Burton and Beckman 2007).

[12] Cialdini et al (1978: 465) discuss the related phenomenon of "lowballing," where a person "makes a behavioral decision concerning a target action" and the decision persists "even after circumstances have changed to make performance of the target action more costly."

"Drive Carefully" sign in their yard if they had been asked earlier to sign an innocuous petition supporting safe driving.

Together, then, operation of norm generation, capabilities generation, and behavioral amplification growing out of early choices made in a CDRP may affect the CDRP's future performance. Early choices may promote (or not) productive collaboration, and then the original degree of collaboration generates positive feedback promoting its continuance. And early choices may promote (or not) the legitimacy of the CDRP as a body, and leaders can use (or not) the early legitimacy they have been granted to take later steps to increase the legitimacy of the collaboration further.

This generates the following hypothesis:

H1: Early choices made in managing a CDRP will influence the later success of the CDRP in reducing crime.

Note that these effects may not operate symmetrically in the case of early choices that ex post turn out to have been productive versus damaging. If choices turn out to be damaging, there will be counter-pressures against continuing on the path the early choices favor. These counter-pressures may have a hard time succeeding – indeed that is an arguments path dependence scholars make – but to the extent they do succeed, any results we see showing an impact of early choice on later performance will be understated, because they will ignore course corrections occurring later after bad choices.

Mechanisms for Initiating Organizational Change

There is a second body of literature relevant to a relationship between early choices and later success. The path dependence literature suggests that if one can

successfully get productive collaboration started early in the history of a CDRP, then those early successes may affect later performance. However, this begs the question of which early choices are likely to set a CDRP on such a path. Getting independent organizations to begin to collaborate requires them to change previous behavior. The literature (e.g. Bardach 1998) discusses a plethora of reasons why this is difficult; with some irony, Huxham and Vangen (2005: 60) observe that "reports of unmitigated [collaboration] success are not common." Thus, creating collaboration among organizations where previously there had been none constitutes a significant organizational change challenge for the agencies constituting a CDRP. And this means that different theories of how best to initiate organizational change will provide competing hypotheses about which early choices are more likely to produce changes in the organizations that constitute a CDRP in the direction of productive collaboration.

In terms of managerial choices, we will focus on the distinction between approaches to initiating organizational change prescribing that change activities begin with efforts to modify the attitudes of participants towards the change being sought versus those prescribing change begin with inducing participants to change behavior, even before attitudes have changed.

Whether the best way to initiate organizational change is through changing attitudes or behavior relates to, but does not directly track, distinctions among norm generation, capabilities generation, and behavior amplification. Norm generation can occur either directly through new norms following attitude change, or indirectly, if (as discussed below) behavior change creates attitudes that in turn generate norms. Capabilities generation and behavior amplification start with behavior change.

Change Attitudes First

Much of the literature on organizational change starts with the assumption that "people resist change" and therefore will not be predisposed to join in a new change effort (Kelman 2005). Most literature suggests that attitudes inhibiting willingness to change be addressed first – following the commonsense intuition that attitudes precede and drive behavior (Ajzen 1996)[13] -- in order then to generate changed behavior.

There are "soft" and "hard" versions of the change attitudes first prescription. The "soft" version involves participatory discussion as a way to "unfreeze" resistance (Lewin 1947, 1958; Coch and French 1948), growing out of Lewin's experiments during World War II on achieving individual change, getting people to eat unorthodox cuts of meat such as beef hearts because of wartime shortages. Lewin compared housewives exposed to lectures by a nutrition expert with ones participating in discussions the expert led, finding the discussion group showed dramatically greater behavioral change. Coch and French found that worker resistance to changing production methods could be overcome through employee participation in designing the change.

Another variant on the "soft" version of attitude change is specifically oriented to government organizations. Public administration scholars have devoted considerable attention in recent years to public service motivation as a driver for public employees (e.g. Perry and Wise 1990; Grant 2008). Appeals to public service motivation – that a change being sought will help the organization fulfill its mission -- may be an important part of an attitude change effort; in the context of cross-agency collaborations, Bardach (1998) argues this was important in motivating participants to contribute to the efforts.

---

[13] This was, however, a controversial view in social psychology for a long time (Kelman 2005).

The “hard” version of attitude change argues that people must be made to understand that failing to change is even harder than changing. As often put in presentations of management consultants, overcoming resistance to change requires – in a reference to what it takes to rouse drilling workers on oil rigs from complacency -- a “burning platform.” The key role of leaders is “establishing a sense of urgency” -- a realization the organization’s prosperity and even survival are at stake (Kotter 1996).

The standard view in literature on change suggests the following hypothesis:

<u>H2: To generate path-dependence mechanisms creating later productive collaboration, it is best for managers to begin by encouraging participants to develop more favorable attitudes towards collaboration (“change attitudes first”).</u>

Change Behavior First

Unlike the emphasis in organizational change literature, most discussions of how path dependence gets launched – from QWERTY to attention to production quantity rather than quality in Communist firms -- start with a behavior, not an attitude. And assuming the ultimate goal sought is behavior change, changing behavior first has the advantage of being the most direct approach, since it represents the ultimate goal.

In the context of the “resistance to change” assumption, however, one may ask how to get people to change behaviors if their attitudes are hostile. One answer is that the assumption is often not fully correct. Kelman (2005) argues there often is a “change vanguard” who are “pre-sold” on the change, which they favor -- for reasons of their own -- before the change has even been initiated. Such people are ready, indeed eager, to act immediately. Announcement of a change – or in this case, launch of a new collaboration – creates a heightened level of arousal for supporters. This is deflated if followed by

activities (studies, teambuilding, visioning or other efforts directed at changing attitudes first) that put off the change itself.

What about getting those with no opinion, on the fence, or even skeptical to act? For a new venture such as a CDRP, there may exist a window of opportunity (Kingdon 1995) generated by initial optimism and enthusiasm about the new activity, analogous to a presidential honeymoon, during which it is easier to engage participants in action even before attitudes have changed. As with reactions of the change vanguard, early action takes advantage of a window of opportunity. Changing attitudes first delays action, and meanwhile the window of opportunity may disappear. Early action also counteracts cynicism ("here we go again" or "flavor of the month") regarding new ventures that get announced but where there are no followup actions; a common criticism of cross-organizational partnerships, not least in the U.K., is that they are only "talking shops" that don't do anything (6 et al 2003: 133).

Finally, for skeptics, or those with no opinion or on the fence, inducing small, less-controversial changes may be relatively easy (Weick 1984). Indeed, small behavioral change may be easier than attitude change, because confirmation bias and other psychological phenomena inhibit attitude change (Lord et al 1979). Small behavioral changes may then, as discussed earlier, become amplified over time.

There is an additional argument for changing behavior first: contrary to the intuitive causal arrow where behavior changes after attitudes, there is evidence -- from considerable experimental research on "cognitive dissonance" and "self-perception" -- behavior change can generate attitude change. Underlying the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) is the observation that people have many cognitions about

themselves and their environment. Often these are unrelated, but sometimes one implies another. If I buy a Coke on a hot day over an equally priced and available lemonade, the implication is I like Coke more than lemonade as a thirst-quencher. In this situation, the two cognitions "I bought a Coke" and "I like a Coke to quench a hot day's thirst" are consonant. By contrast, the two cognitions "I bought a Coke" and "I like lemonade" are dissonant. Festinger's argument is that dissonance is uncomfortable and people to try to reduce it. Often they do so by changing their attitude to fit their behavior. So reduction of cognitive dissonance allows behavior to produce attitude. According to self-perception theory (Bem1972: 2), "Individuals come to know their attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior." Finally, considerable research has established existence of a "mere exposure effect" (Harrison 1977), by which is meant the positive impact on one's attitude towards something of simple repeated exposure to it.[14]

Alternatively, behavior can affect later attitudes because, by behaving a certain way, one may discover that in fact the behavior is something one values, or has learned to value. One may "develop new…appreciations…of what is important" (Jervis 1997: 53); C. Wright Mills argued (quoted in March and Olsen 2006: 704) that behaving according to a norm will over time "often induce a man [sic] to become what at first he merely sought to appear." Habermas (1989), in the context of democratic theory, argued that frequent participation in deliberation, where one was required to make arguments in terms of the public good, would over time turn the selfish into citizens.

This alternative approach to initiating change suggests the following hypothesis:

[14] The research has involved early exposure to stimuli such as pictures, words, or names, but it seems plausible to believe it would apply to exposure to behaviors as well.

H3: To generate path-dependence mechanisms creating later productive collaboration, it is best for managers to begin by inducing participants to engage in collaborative actions ("change behavior first").

External Legitimacy and Capacity Building

We test two additional hypotheses for early priorities – enhancing external support and building operating capacity. Neither features prominently in organizational change literature, but both are discussed in broader public administration literature as important early priorities. Public organizations require external support from political actors for funds and legitimacy. Moore (1995) is associated with the view (p. 105) that "[s]trategic management in the public sector begins by looking up towards politics," which deserves "pride of place" among managerial priorities. As for capacity building, it is a commonplace in collaboration literature, including case studies, to note they suffer from having minimal capacity, so building collaborations up as organizations is often recommended as crucial to success (Thatcher 2004; Provan and Milward 1995). In terms of early activities for a collaboration, Mattessich et al (2001: 27) argue, "Obtaining the financial means for existence must be a priority in forming a collaborative group."

One could argue both these choices share the characteristic of building the ability of the CDRP later on to do things but delaying efforts to change either attitudes or behavior. However, gaining external support might be argued to extend the window of opportunity for getting started on behavior change by injecting new energy into the collaboration, while also possibly promoting attitude change towards collaboration, especially among fence-sitters. Capacity building would not provide these benefits.

H4: To generate path-dependence mechanisms creating later productive collaboration, it is best for managers to begin by enhancing the collaboration's external legitimacy.

H5: To generate path-dependence mechanisms creating later productive collaboration, it is best for managers to begin by building the collaboration's operating capacity.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

Data about managerial choices come from a 2008 survey of the community safety manager first appointed after CDRP's started in 1999. Unlike many collaborations, CDRP'S are managed through a "network administrative organization" (Provan and Kenis 2008) – a dedicated unit with its own staff, separate from constituent agencies. The head of that unit is called a "community safety manager." The National Community Safety Network, the professional association representing these managers, worked for us to try to locate names and email addresses of the first managers appointed after passage of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Act in 1998. However, it was not easy to do so; contact information was located for only 106 managers, of 376 CDRP's.

The survey was initiated by an email directing respondents to an Internet instrument with fixed-response questions. Four followup emails were sent to those who didn't respond to earlier requests. We ended up with 30 surveys, a 28% response rate. Obviously, this is a modest sample size.

Dependent Variable

Our measure of performance is change in crime. For the period covered by this research, the U.K. government established performance targets for crime reduction. For 2001-04 these involved vehicle crime and burglary; there was an additional target to

reduce robbery in ten large cities (Home Office 2003). For 2005-08, there were targets for reduction in nine kinds of well-reported crimes[15] (Home Office 2004). Our dependent variable is the 2008-09[16] crime rate by CDRP, aggregated for crime categories of the 2005-08 period. Crime data were provided by the Home Office; we used population data to calculate rates. We transformed crime logarithmically to enable interpretation of coefficients as percentage impacts.[17] As will be seen below, we introduce lagged crime as an independent variable, so our model measures crime change.

Independent Variables

Management Practices

Data come from one question in our survey, in which the respondent was presented a list of 16 management practices. The list was introduced with the following statement: "The following is a list of possible management priorities for a Community Safety Manager. For each of the factors listed, please tick the box that best describes how important each priority has been for you personally as a Community Safety Manager." (emphasis in original) Choices were: (1) "This is a top priority," (2) "This is important to me," (3) "I pay some attention to this, but it's not a real priority," and (4) "This is not something I pay much attention to." If the respondent gave more than two practices a top rating, an instruction appeared to limit the number of top priorities to two. We did this to insure variance, rather than allowing respondents to say they prioritized everything.

This procedure generated values ranging from "1" to "5," where "1"=the highest priority, either as stated initially or after the respondent was limited to two top priorities,

[15] To vehicle crime, burglary, and robbery were added assault, wounding, vehicle interference and tampering, bicycle theft, theft from the person, and criminal damage (vandalism).
[16] Through July 1.
[17] To make results more intuitive, we reverse-coded crime, so a lower value (including a negative value if crime increased) means crime was higher.

“2”= initially presented as a highest priority, but not among the top two chosen after the followup, and each other value moved down one notch (e.g. original “3” became “4”) to reflect recoding. To make interpretation more intuitive, all values were reverse-coded.

We categorized priorities into ones reflecting H2-5[18] (see Figure 1 for exact wordings):

(a) <u>“Change Attitudes first”</u>: These were TRUST, POWER SHARED, VISION, and LEGAL PRESSURE.

With regard to trustbuilding, there is no clearer theme in literature on managing collaborations than the importance of creating trust among partners Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Shortell et al. 2002; Thomas 2003; Huxham and Vangen 2005; Thomson, Perry, and Miller 2008). Mattessich et al 2001, 14-15) argue:

> At the very beginning of an effort, collaborating partners should temporarily set aside the purpose of the collaboration and devote energy to learning about each other. …Time should be set aside to understand how language is used and how members perceive each other

One study comparing more and less successful community health partnerships concluded that successes developed methods for "open communication" and "spent considerable

---

[18] There is a considerable, though not perfect, overlap between practices directed at attitudes versus behavior, and our earlier categorization in ANONYMIZED of collaboration-specific and quasi-hierarchical ones. For the attitudes-first/collaboration-specific pairing, the commonality is that many collaboration-specific practices are based on the view that, lacking hierarchical tools, managers need to change participant attitudes so they wish voluntarily to collaborate. The commonality between behavior-first/hierarchical practices is that in single organizations the ability to act is taken for granted, and hence many practices are action-promoting. Collaboration-specific practices from the earlier paper here characterized as behavior-first (LOCAL INITIATIVES and INFORMATION SHARING) are behavior- rather than attitude-oriented, but they are also special for collaborations – hence the difference in classification in this paper compared to the earlier one. In our earlier work, to focus our hypothesis testing, we did not include the external legitimacy variables, though we examined them in unpublished analysis, nor MONEY CONFLICTS. The survey of current managers did not include LEGAL PRESSURE.

.

time working through potential points of conflict and building trust among themselves" (Shortell et al 2002: 76).

There is also experimental evidence (e.g. Axelrod 1984; Bennenhausen and Murnighan 1985; see also Huxham and Vangen 2005 in a collaboration context) that early trust in interactions breeds later trust. However, these experiments must be interpreted carefully in terms of any implications for early CDRP management choices. In these experiments, the early activities in question were behaviors displaying trust, not investments in creating trusting attitudes. Our question wording (how much of a priority was "building trust among partners") could in theory refer to efforts to establish trusting behaviors as well as create trusting attitudes. However, we suspect most respondents would interpret "building" trust as referring to efforts consciously to create trusting attitudes, such as through use of joint "away days" among partners, teambuilding exercises, or efforts to explain the jargon of one partner to other partners – all of which were mentioned in exploratory interviews as actions some CDRP's took early on.

Visioning also is central in collaboration literature (Bardach 1998; Mitchell and Shortell 2000; Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 2001; Mattesich et al 2001), where it is seen as key to improving attitudes towards collaborating. Gray (2008, 668) writes: "A critical task for launching a new partnership is that of visioning, which involves recognizing the potential value of a collaborative alliance, imagining how the parties can collaborate, and conveying this vision to them**."** Crosby and Bryson (2010, 219) state that "shared vision" must first be developed "if [partners] are to agree on and implement new projects."

Finally, to build desire to collaborate, many argue that fair treatment of partners, particularly less-powerful ones, is essential: "Significant power imbalances among

collaborating partners are likely to breed mistrust and thus prevent partners from easily agreeing on a shared purpose" (Crosby and Bryson 2010, 225; see also Huxham and Vangen 2005).

In a CDRP context, outside legal requirements for member agencies to participate in the CDRP is the hard face of change attitudes first: Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act requires that partner organizations cooperate with each other in the CDRP.

(b) "Change Behavior first": These were LOCAL INITIATIVES, INFORMATION SHARING, FOLLOW-THROUGH, BLOCKAGES, MONEY CONFLICTS, and PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT.

Each of these represents a managerial activity associated with getting a CDRP doing something. The first two (developing tailored local initiatives and encouraging information sharing among partner organizations) are actions themselves. Each (local initiatives e.g. Lasker, Weiss, and Miller 200; Rosenbaum 2002; Thatcher 2004; information sharing e.g. 6 et al 2006) has been discussed in the literature as actions collaborations often take. The others are ways for the manager work in support of getting things done (by, for example, making sure partners follow through on commitments to act, dealing with blockages or money conflicts interfering with action, or measuring consequences of action in terms of performance).

(c) External Legitimacy: These were CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ELECTED OFFICIALS, MEDIA, and VOLUNTARY SECTOR.

(d) Capacity building: These were ACCESSING MONEY and MORE STAFF.

Spending time trying to get funds or staff does, if successful, eventually create capacity but, as noted earlier, when the CDRP is getting started, delay efforts to change

either attitudes or behavior. This is in contrast to performance measurement, which creates a kind of capacity but one directly supporting actions to improve performance.

Control Variables

We controlled for crime at the beginning of the period (2002-03).[19] Additionally, as in ANONYMIZED, we tested numerous demographic and organizational variables as controls. Data for these came from the 2001 British census and other published sources.

We were also concerned about possible omitted variable bias involving the initial level of enthusiasm for the CDRP effort. Low enthusiasm might be associated both with choice of initial priorities and also with later success in reducing crime: for example, low enthusiasm might both incline managers to emphasize invoking legal authority and also produce poorer later performance. Without including a measure of initial enthusiasm as a control, estimates of the impact of such priorities might inaccurately make these choices appear to produce negative impacts on performance. We thus included in the model the response to the following question (reverse-coded): "When this CDRP first started, there were a significant number of people in partner organizations who were already very enthusiastic about the idea of partnership working."

Small Sample Size

A fundamental issue for the analysis is our small sample size, which limits the statistical power of our model. If we use the full list of 16 management practices, along with initial enthusiasm and significant controls, our results are likely to be too conservative, with p-values becoming insignificant because of poor statistical power. We have chosen to deal with this through using a stepwise regression procedure to reduce the number of variables in our model. However, this creates two different risks. One is

[19] Earlier data were unavailable (ANONYMIZED).

omitted variable bias, where shared variance between a variable remaining in the model and eliminated variables exaggerates the effect of those variables in the model. A related problem is possible arbitrariness in variable elimination in stepwise regression, where possibly small differences in p-values among variables results in elimination of one variable over another, producing a different list of significant variables from those that might have been produced with slightly different p-values. Because of these two potential problems, we perform robustness checks on our model.

Due to our small sample size, we used p=.15 as a threshold – keeping in mind that at this value, a result has only a one in six chance of being due to chance.[20] As we shall see, however, in our final model all significant variables had p-values better than .1.

Sample Bias

Since we were able to locate only about one-fourth of first community safety managers, we were less concerned about whether our 30 respondents accurately represented that group than about whether they accurately represented all CDRP's. In particular, we suspected it was easier to locate first managers who were still serving a decade later than others, and that such managers might be more successful than a typical first manager. We had data for the first managers on whether they were still serving, and, from a different survey (ANONYMIZED) about the length of service of current managers. We found our sample did indeed dramatically overrepresent first managers who were still leading their CDRP, so we weighted to correct this.

[20] Note in this regard the argument that social scientists give excessive attention to bright-line thresholds for "significant" results, as opposed for example to coefficient sizes (Zilliak and McCloskey 2008). Cohen 1988: xx argues that, "[w]hen power issues are brought into consideration, some circumstances may dictate unconventionally large" cutoff points for acceptable p-values." He briefly analyzes how acceptable p-values may be influenced by sample size, but points out that "[t]his type of analysis is very uncommon, at least partly because of the strength of the significance criterion convention."

Retrospective Recall Bias

Our survey asked respondents to remember priorities from a decade earlier, an approach frequently used in research in epidemiology, labor market behavior, and consumption habits, as well as oral histories and interview-based qualitative research (Pearson et al 1992). However, recall questions are subject to systematic bias in the direction of one's current opinion ("current-attitude bias"), investigated empirically in many different contexts (e.g. Withey l954; Goethels and Rickman l973; Niemi et al l980; Collins et al 1985; McFarland and Ross l987). "[P]eople are cognitive conservatives who bias their memories so as to deny change" (Breckler and Greenwald 1986: 134).

However, we do not believe current-attitude bias is a problem with our data. Absent currently generally accepted views about what early actions managers should have taken, there are no answers that even in retrospect would be seen as right. Also, we asked about a central feature of respondents' jobs, about which the evidence is that memory is more accurate than if a person is asked to recall a foreign policy opinion a decade later. Of course, with recall random memory errors will occur, creating noise and making it even more challenging to generate statistically significant results.

Method

We tested hypotheses using OLS with robust standard errors, using stepwise regression with backward elimination (Efroymsom 1960) to eliminate insignificant variables.[21] In this procedure, a full model is run, and the variable with the "worst" p-value eliminated, after which the model is run again, and the newly "worst" variable eliminated, continuing until all remaining variables had p-values better than .15. We first

[21] We tested both backward and forward elimination methods. Both produced similar results, but the R^2 for backward elimination was higher, so we used this technique.

ran a stepwise regression for the controls, which produced three significant ones (initial crime, population and unitary/two-tier local government[22]), and then incorporated these into a model with management priorities and the initial enthusiasm control.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for management priorities, control variables, and initial enthusiasm. Table 2 presents results of our stepwise regression; log population and unitary/two-tier council controls were eliminated from the model, along with 6 of the 16 management priorities, while 10 management priorities, initial crime, and initial enthusiasm remained. Tables 3 presents a robustness test.

Our most dramatic result is that there are management priorities chosen early in the history of a CDRP that noticeably influence CDRP performance almost a decade later.[23] (These variables are all statistically significant at a conventional .1 level, and most at .05 or better.) Thus, H1 is supported. Table Three shows these fall into two categories – "change behavior first" and gain external legitimacy, supporting H3 and H5. Prioritizing four of the five "change behavior first" practices was associated with crime reduction, as did two of the four external legitimacy variables. Prioritizing none of the "change attitude first" practices reduced crime later on. Finally, prioritizing both practices to create capacity was associated with poorer performance – the more a manager prioritized bidding for central government money or adding staff, the worse later performance was. Since prioritizing these practices had the effect of delaying

[22] Two-tier authorities, in sparsely populated areas, divide up local responsibilities into higher-tier county and lower-tier district governments. This is often regarded as making collaboration more difficult, because the CDRP exists at the lower level, but some partner organizations are at the upper one.
[23] Multicollinearity is not a problem. The highest VIF (6.90) was for initial crime; average VIF for all the significant variables was 3.05. In this model, only the control variables initial crime and initial enthusiasm remained significant; the other two dropped out.

actions and thus closing an early window of opportunity, this result may be seen as underlying the value of changing behavior first.[24]

Robustness Checks

We ran a non-reduced version of our model, leaving in all 16 management practices, initial enthusiasm, and initial crime – so 18 variables for a sample size of 30. When we did so, LOCAL INITIATIVES created a multicollinearity problem (VIF=11.29), with initial crime also slightly over the recommended limit of 10. Re-run without LOCAL INITIATIVES, the highest VIF dropped to 8.51, and the average was 3.33. In this model, the number of variables significant at the .15 level declines a good deal, but the pattern of which are significant is similar to Table 2: two of the five "change behavior first" variables remain significant, as does one of the four external legitimacy ones. The two capacity variables remain significant, with negative signs.[25]

We also ran a second robustness check to see whether results were influenced by elimination of one variable rather than another when their p-values were very similar. When a variable was eliminated by our procedure, we looked to see whether the variable with the "next-worst" p-value – which with our procedure was retained in the next step – had a p-value that was "better" by .05 or less than the eliminated variable.[26] If there was such a variable, we ran the backward elimination by retaining the first variable in the next stage, while eliminating instead the second one, to see if changing which variable continued to be included. This procedure did not change our final results at all.

---

[24] Since we have reduced the number of variables tested in our models, we pay less attention to reported effect sizes -- percentage crime change estimates our models generate -- since these may be high because they include the impact of omitted variables.

[25] In the model including LOCAL INITIATIVES, the "change behavior first" variable FOLLOW-THROUGH had a p-value of .155, and INFORMATION SHARING had a p-value of .195.

[26] So if p=.55 for the "worst" variable (which our procedure eliminated), we looked to see whether there was a variable with a p-value .between .50 and .54.

DISCUSSION

We believe the broader contributions of this paper are two. First, we seek to direct attention of public administration scholars to a large body of social science research on path dependence. This is consistent with an effort to move public administration research closer to mainstream social science (Kelman 2007). Second, we believe we make a contribution to an ongoing debate about how most-fruitfully to initiate organizational change, as well as providing evidence, coming at the question from a quite different perspective, on the importance of external legitimacy for public management success.

Our results suggest a distinction between what we will call a practice's launch value, involving the practice's utility in imprinting the collaboration for constructive collaboration, and its instrumental value in a steady state, as an ongoing tool for managing an established collaboration. Such a distinction is common in many elements of organizational and personal life. It is a common observation in research on business startups (Grenier 1972) that some practices that have launch value in promoting a firm's early success are different from those helping an established enterprise to succeed. In personal life, strong parental direction may have great launch value in child rearing, while later other practices (such as granting the child more autonomy) may work better.[27]

In our earlier work examining the impact of management practices, we found success was typically contingent on various background conditions, such as the overall quality of local government performance. We tested the same interactions here and found they were not significant.[28] We suggest this is due to the distinction between a practice's

[27] There is some overlap between practices found successful here and in a steady state, though even here, we would suggest that reasons the practices are successful are different.

[28] We interacted, as per in our results in ANONYMIZED, TRUST with percentage of teens and lagged crime, and PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT and BLOCKAGES with the local authority's overall

launch value, which depends more on general human psychology, and its instrumental value, more likely to be contingent.

Our results here are stronger than those emerging (ANONYMIZED) from an earlier analysis of a survey of current community safety managers. More priorities have an impact on crime, and these occur as main effects; coefficient sizes, though these should be interpreted with caution, are also large.

We can imagine two possible explanations for this difference. One is a radical version of path dependency, where positive feedback means small differences, even due to chance, can generate large differences for later outcomes compared to another outcome that was almost equally possible but never occurred (Pierson 1994) -- the so-called "Cleopatra's nose" phenomenon proposed by Pascal (Boorstin 1994), suggesting its short size made her more attractive to Marc Antony and thus changed the course of world history.[29] In this version, differences between initial impacts of priorities are much smaller than eventual ones, as effects get magnified over time, consistent with the metaphor of "branching" (Verba 1971), where small differences, causing branches to diverge, get magnified, spreading further apart over time.

---

performance score. We did this several ways – just testing the one interaction, and also with the other significant main effects in Table 2. No interaction was significant at .15 except for that between TRUST and percentage teens with all other significant main effects, (p= .11). but the sign was negative (the opposite of results in ANONYMIZED, suggesting that the higher the percentage teens, the more an early investment in trust generation worsened performance. Were this so, the reason would relate to the broader argument presented here, which is that the most productive launch practices involve activities, and that the greater the challenge the CDRP faced, from a high percentage of teens, the greater the costs of misplaced priorities, particularly for a high-cost priority, which trust generation -- with away days and team-building activities -- is likely to be, at least early in a collaboration's history, though less so later on.

[29] David (1985) presents this view – although in his story, initial adoption of QWERTY did not occur for chance reasons, but rather consciously to slow typist speed down. This approach stands "in sharp contrast to prominent modes of argument and explanation in the social sciences, which attribute 'large' outcomes to 'large causes" (Pierson 1994: 19). Hacker (1998:78) notes that this is different from the "critical juncture" approach, which also sees the importance of history but suggests decisions made at critical junctures were themselves significant ones, not minor or products of happenstance, creating "historical 'big bangs.'"

A second explanation involves measurement noise in the method we used in the earlier paper that used priorities reported in a survey of current managers, based on their current priorities, to represent managerial choices through the history of the partnership. We noted in that paper that noise this assumption created meant our results may have been too conservative. To the extent those results were marred by noise, differences we see may not reflect real differences in the impact of these choices.

We cannot fully judge which explanation for the difference in our results is more plausible. However, to the extent results in this paper are also conservative, due to our small sample size (rather than to measurement error, as in the previous paper), this argues against an explanation of the difference based on the conservatism of one set of results. So, while the evidence is hardly dispositive, there is at least some suggestion that we find a radical path-dependency result here.

These results also provide managers practical advice about what early choices turn out to have been good ones for these inter-agency collaborations. Though these managers presumably made choices they believed would promote longrun success (though likely other reasons also explain why these choices might have gotten made as well), there was no body of evidence at the time providing advice about which choices would be good ones. This paper begins to provide such practical guidance to managers.

Limitations

While noting contributions this study makes, we also note its limitations. The most important is obvious and has been discussed -- our small sample size. Beyond that, there are various questions about the external validity of our findings regarding the superiority of a "change behavior first" approach to other settings. Because

collaborations are often criticized as "talking shops," it may be particularly important for them (compared with other kinds of organizations) to show early action so as not to dissipate enthusiasm. More broadly, as noted, "change behavior first" is more attractive the higher the initial support for the change is. Frequency distributions for responses to our question about initial enthusiasm show exactly half the first managers reported that initial enthusiasm for the CDRP among member organizations was high, a significant degree of initial support, making a "change behavior first" approach more attractive. Our findings might not apply to situations with little initial support for a change effort.

Despite any limitations, we believe our results are dramatic. Early managerial choices can have important impacts on later organizational performance. These choices therefore should be made with care.

FIGURE 1: WORDING FOR MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES

Change Attitudes First

1. building trust among partners (TRUST)
2. communicating a vision of how partnership working can make our community safer. (VISION)
3. working hard to see to it that power is shared equitably in the Partnership (POWER SHARED)
4. Making clear to partners what their responsibilities under Section 17 of the [Crime and Disorder Act] (LEGAL PRESSURE)

Change Behavior First

5. developing our own tailored initiatives, over and above central government initiatives (LOCAL INITIATIVES)
6. encouraging information sharing among partners (INFORMATION SHARING)
7. making sure there is follow-through on commitments partners make (FOLLOW-THROUGH)
8. dealing with blockages that are hurting the ability/willingness of partners to work together (BLOCKAGES)
9. resolving issues and conflicts about how central government funds are to be allocated among partner organizations and activities (MONEY CONFLICTS)
10. implementing robust performance measurement/management (PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT)

Gaining External Legitimacy

11. obtaining or retaining strong support from the Chief Executive for community safety work (CHIEF EXECUTIVE)
12. nurturing good relations with elected members (ELECTED OFFICIALS)
13. getting good media coverage for our initiatives (MEDIA)
14. nurturing good relations with the voluntary sector (VOLUNTARY SECTOR)

Building Capacity

15. obtaining access to central government funds (ACCESSING MONEY)
16. pressing partners to commit more staff effort to partnership work (MORE STAFF)

TABLE TWO: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
1 .TRUST	3.7	.95
2. VISION	3.13	1.01
3. POWER SHARED	2.57	.82
4. LEGAL PRESSURE	3.4	.72
5. LOCAL INITIATIVES	3.33	.88
6. INFORMATION SHARING	3.47	.90
7. FOLLOW-THROUGH	3.6	.81
8. BLOCKAGES	3.57	.86
9. MONEY CONFLICTS	2.9	1.09
10. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT	3.03	.72
11. CHIEF EXECUTIVE	3.53	.82
12. ELECTED OFFICIALS	3.03	.89
13. MEDIA	2.63	.89
14. VOLUNTARY SECTOR	2.6	.67
15. ACCESSING MONEY	3.47	1.04
16. MORE STAFF	3.23	.73

TABLE THREE: REGRESSION MODEL

Variable	Coefficient
VISION	$-.10^{*}$
LOCAL INITIATIVES	$.10^{*}$
INFORMATION SHARING	$.07^{*}$
FOLLOW-THROUGH	$.08^{*}$
MONEY CONFLICTS	$.04^{*}$
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT	$.09^{**}$
CHIEF EXECUTIVE	$.05^{\dagger}$
ELECTED OFFICIALS	$.08^{\dagger}$
ACCESSING MONEY	$-.09^{*}$
MORE STAFF	$-.05^{\dagger}$
Initial Enthusiasm	$.11^{\dagger}$
log Initial Crime	$.44^{**}$
Constant	$.71^{*}$

N = 30
F(12, 17) = 45.65
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.94

† $p < .1$
* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

ROBUSTNESS CHECK NO EXCLUDED PRIORITY VARIABLES

Variable	Coefficient
TRUST	.02
VISION	-.01
POWER SHARED	-.04
LEGAL PRESSURE	-.08
INFORMATION SHARING	.03
FOLLOW-THROUGH	.04
BLOCKAGES	.03
MONEY CONFLICTS	.04††
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT	.05††
CHIEF EXECUTIVE	.02
ELECTED OFFICIALS	.03
MEDIA	.09†
VOLUNTARY SECTOR	.03
ACCESSING MONEY	-.08†
MORE STAFF	-.07*
Initial Enthusiasm	-.01
log Initial Crime	.56**
Constant	1.10**

N = 30
F(12, 17) = 33.51
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.95

†† $p < .15$
† $p < .1$
* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

References

Agranoff, Robert. 2007. *Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2001. Big questions in public network management research. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 11 (3): 295-326.

Aiken, L. S., and S. G. West. 1991. *Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Argote, Linda. 1999. *Organizational learning: Creating, retaining, and transferring knowledge*. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Bardach, Eugene. 1998. *Getting agencies to work together: The practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Baron, James N., Michael T. Hannan, and M. D. Burton. 1999. Building the iron cage: Determinants of managerial intensity in the early years of organizations. *American Sociological Review* 64 (4) (08): 527-47.

Barro, Robert, and David Gordon. 1983. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model . *Journal of Political Economy* 91 (4): 589-610.

Becker, Markus C. 2012. *Entrepreneurial imprinting and organizational persistence: The case of carl zeiss*. Preprint: Danish Institute for Advanced Study ed. Odense, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark.

Bem, Daryl J. 1972. Self-perception theory. In *Advances in experimental psychology.*, ed. Leonard Berkowitz. Vol. 6 ed., 1-62. New York and London: Academic Press, Inc.

Bettenhausen, Kenneth, and J. Keith Murnighan. 1985. The emergence of norms in competitive decision-making groups. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 30 (3): 350-72.

Boeker, Warren. 1989. Strategic change: The effects of founding and history. *Academy of Management Journal* 32 (3) (09): 489-515.

Boorstin, Daniel J. 1994. *Cleopatra's nose: Essays on the unexpected*. New York, NY: Random House.

Bryson, John M., and Barbara C. Crosby. 2008. Failing into cross-sector collaboration successfully. In *Big ideas in collaborative public management.*, eds. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Rosemary O'Leary, 55-78. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

Burton, M. D., and C. M. Beckman. 2007. Leaving a legacy: Position imprints and successor turnover in young firms. *American Sociological Review* 72 (2) (April): 239-66.

Carley, Michael, Mike Chapman, Annette Hastings, Karryn Kirk, and Raymond Young. 2000. *Urban regeneration through partnership: A study in nine urban regions in england, scotland, and wales*. Bristol, UK: The Policy Press and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1962. *Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of the american industrial enterprise*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Coglianese, Cary. 2003. Is satisfaction success? evaluating public participation in regulatory policymaking. In *The promise and performance of environmental conflict resolution.*, eds. Rosemary O'Leary, Lisa B. Bingham, 69-89. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the political arena*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Crampton, Suzanne M., and John A. Wagner III. 1994. Percept-percept inflation in microorganizational research: An investigation of prevalence and effect. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 79 (1) (02): 67-76.

David, Paul A. 2001. Path dependence, its critics and the quest for 'historical economics'. In *Evolution and path dependence in economic ideas, past and present.*, eds. Pierre Garrouste, Stavros Ioannides, 15-40. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

———. 1985. **Clio and the economics of QWERTY**. *American Economic Review* 75 (No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association): 332-7.

Doty, D. Harold, and William H. Glick. 1998. Common methods bias: Does common methods variance really bias results? *Organizational Research Methods* 1 (4): 374-406.

Festinger, Leon. 1957. *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson.

Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back. 1950. *Social pressures in informal groups* . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Glick, William H., JR JENKINS G.DOUGLAS, and NINA GUPTA. 1986. Method versus substance: How strong are underlying relationships between job characteristics and attitudinal outcomes? *Academy of Management Journal* 29 (3) (09): 441-64.

Grant, Adam M. 2008. **Employees without a cause: The motivational effects of prosocial impact in public service**. *International Public Management Journal* 11 (1): 48-66.

Gray, Barbara. 2008. Intervening to improve interorganizational partnerships . In *The oxford handbook of inter-organizational relations.*, eds. Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris Huxham and Peter Smith Ring, 664-690. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hacker, Jacob S. 1998. The historical logic of national health insurance: Structure and sequence in the development of british, canadian, and U.S. medical policy. *Studies in American Political Development* 12 (Spring): 57-130.

Hall, Peter A., Rosemary C. R. Taylor, and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44 (5) (12): 936-57.

Hannan, M., and J. Freeman. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. *American Journal of Sociology* 32 : 929-64.

Hartz, Louis. 1955. *The liberal tradition in america*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

Hicks, Darrin, Carl Larson, Christopher Nelson, David L. Olds, and Erik Johnston. 2008. The influence of collaboration on program outcomes: The colorado nurse-family partnership. *Evaluation Review* 32 (5): 453-77.

Homans, George C. 1974. *Social behavior: Its elementary forms, revised ed*. New York: Harcourt Brace and World.

Huxham, Chris, and Siv Vangen. 2005. *Managing to collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative advantage*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis.*, eds. Walter W. Powell, Paul J. DiMaggio, 143-163. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1997. *System effects: Complexity in political and social life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Johnston, Erik W., Darrin Hicks, Ning Nan, and Jennifer C. Auer. 2011. Managing the inclusion process in collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21 (4): 699-721.

Kelman, Steve. 2007. Public administration and organization studies. *The Academy of Management Annals: Volume 1*.

———. 2005. *Unleashing change: A study of organizational renewal in government*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Kelman, Steven. 2006. Improving service delivery performance in the united kingdom: Organization theory perspectives on central intervention strategies. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 8 (4): 393-419.

Kickert, W. J. M., E-H Klijn, and J. F. M. Koppenjan. 1997. Introduction: A management perspective on policy networks. In *Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector.*, eds. W. J. M. Kickert, E-H Klijn and J. F. M. Koppenjan, 1-13. London: Sage Publications.

Kimberly, John R. 1975. Environmental constraints and organizational structure: A comparative analysis of rehabilitation organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20 (1): 1-9.

Klijn, Erik-Hans. 2008. Policy and implementation networks: Managing complex interactions. In *The oxford handbook of inter-organizational relations.*, eds. Steve Cropper, Mark Ebers, Chris Huxham and Peter Smith Ring, 118-146. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kriauciunas, Aldas, and Prashant Kale. 2006. The impact of socialist imprinting and search on resource change: A study of firms in lithuiania. *Strategic Management Journal* 27 : 659-79.

Langbein, Laura, and Cornelius Kerwin. 2000. Regulatory negotiation versus conventional rulemaking: Claims and counter-claims. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10 (3): 599-632.

Lasker, Roz D., Elisa S. Weiss, and Rebecca Miller. 2001. Partnership synergy: A practical framework for studying and strengthening the collaborative advantace. *The Milbank Quarterly* 79 (2): 179-205.

Lawrence, Barbara S. 1984. Historical perspective: Using the past to study the present. *Academy of Management Review* 9 (2): 307-12.

Lawrence, Paul R., and Jay William Lorsch. 1967. *Organization and environment; managing differentiation and integration*. Homewood, Ill.,: R. D. Irwin.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Rokkan Stein. 1967. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction. In *Party systems and voter alignments.*, eds. Seymour Martin Lipset, Rokkan Stein, 1-64. New York, NY: The Free Press.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 2006. The logic of appropriateness. In *The oxford handbook of public policy.*, eds. Michael Moran, Martin Rein and Robert E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marquis, Christopher. 2003. The pressure of the past: Network imprinting in intercorporate communities. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 48 (4) (12): 655-89.

Marquis, Christopher, and Zhi Huang. Acquisitions as exaptation: The legacy of founding institutions in the U.S. commercial banking industry. *Academy of Management Journal*: 1473.

Martin Lipsett, Seymour. 1963. *The first new nation: The united states in historical and comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc.

Mattessich, P. W., and Barbara Monsey R. 1992. *Collaboration: What makes it work? A review of research literature on factors influencing successful collaboration*. 1st edition ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Amherst H. Wilder Foundation.

Mayhew, David R. 1986. *Placing parties in american politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Merton, Robert K. 1957. Bureaucratic structure and personality. In *Social theory and social structure.*, ed. Robert K. Merton, 249-260. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Meyer, Marshall W., and M. Craig Brown. 197. The process of bureaucratization. *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (2): 364-85.

Mitchell, Shannon M., and Stephen M. Shortell. 2000. The governance and management of effective community health partnerships: A typology for research, policy, and practice. *The Milbank Quarterly* 78 (2): 241-89.

Moe, Terry M. 1984. The new economics of organization. *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (4) (11): 739.

Moore, Mark H. 1995. *Creating public value: Strategic management in government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mussweiler, Thomas, and Fritz Strack. 1999. Comparing is believing: A selective accessibility model of judgmental anchoring. *European Review of Social Psychology* 10 (1): 135-57.

Pearson, Robert W., Michael A. Ross, and Robyn M. Dawes. 1992. Personal recall and the limits of retrospective questions in surveys. In *Questions about questions: Inquiries into the cognitive bases of surveys.*, 65-94. New York, NY, US: Russell Sage Foundation.

Peck, Edward, Perri 6, Pauline Gulliver, and David Towell. 2004. Why do we keep on meeting like this? the board as ritual in health and social care. *Health Services Management Research* 17 : 100-9.

Perry, J. L., and L. R. Wise. 1990. The motivational bases of public service. *Public Administration Review* 50 (3): 367-73.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Podsakoff, Philip M., Scott B. MacKenzie, Jeoing-Yeon Lee, and Nathan P. Podsakoff. 2003. Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 88 (5): 879-903.

Provan, Keith G., and Patrick Kenis. 2008. Modes of network governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18 (2): 229-52.

Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi 1945-, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. *Making democracy work : Civic traditions in modern italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985.
The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 100 (4): 1169-89.

Rosenbaum, D. P. 2002. Evaluating multi-agency anti-crime partnerships: Theory, design, and measurement issues. *Crime Prevention Studies* 14 : 171-225.

Salancik, Gerald R., and Jeffrey Pfeffer. 1977. An examination of need-satisfaction models of job attitudes. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 22 (3) (09): 427-56.

Selznick, Philip. 1957. *Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

———. 1953. *TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal organization*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.

Shortell, Stephen M., Ann P. Zukoski, Jeffrey A. Alexander, Gloria J. Bazzoli, Douglas A. Conrad, Romana Hasnain-Wynia, Soshanna Sofaer, Benjamin Y. Chan, Elizabeth Casey, and Frances S. Margolin. 2002. Evaluating partnerships for community health improvement: Tracking the footprints. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 27 (1): 49-91.

Spector, Paul E., Saniel J. Dwyer, and Steve M. Jex. 1988. Relation of job stressors to affective, health, and performance outcomes: A comparison of multiple data sources. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 73 (1) (02): 11-9.

Stinchcombe, A. L. 1968. *Constructing social theories*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc.

———. 1965. Social structure and organizations. In *Handbook of organizations.*, ed. James G. March, 142-193. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.

Thacher, David. 2004. Interorganizational partnerships as inchoate hierarchies: A case study of the community security initiative. *Administration & Society* 36 (1): 91-127.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 : 369-404.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1) (06): 369.

Thomas, Craig W. 2003. *Bureaucratic landscapes: Interagency cooperation and the preservation of biodiversity*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Thomson, Ann Marie, James L. Perry, and Theodore K. Miller. 2008. Linking collaboration processes and outcomes: Foundations for advancing empirical theory. In *Big ideas in collaborative public management.*, eds. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Rosemary O'Leary, 97-120. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

Tuckman, Bruce W. 1965. Developmental sequence in small groups. *Psychological Bulletin* 63 (6): 384-99.

Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Khaneman. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science* 185 (4157): 1124-31.

———. 1973. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. *Cognitive Psychology* 5 : 207-32.

Vangen, Siv, and Chris Huxham. 2003. Nurturing collaborative relations: Building trust in interorganizational collaboration. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science;* 39 (1): 5-31.

Verba, Sidney. 2971. Sequences and development. In *Crises and sequences in political development.*, eds. Leonard Binder, James Coleman, Lucian Pye, Myron Weiner and Joseph Lapalombara, 308. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Weber, Max. 1949. *Methodology of social sciences*, eds. Edward A. Shils, Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Weick, Karl E. 1984. Small wins: Redefining the scale of social problems. *The American Psychologist* 39 (1): 40-9.

Williams, Larry J., M. Ronald Buckley, and Joseph A. Cote. 1989. Lack of method variance in self-reported affect and perceptions at work: Reality or artifact? *Journal of Applied Psychology* 74 (3) (06): 462.

Williamson, Oliver E. 1995. *Organization theory: From chester barnard to the present and beyond*, ed. Oliver E. Williamson. Expanded Edition ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Withey, Stephen B. 1954. Reliability of recall of income. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*
18 (2) (Summer): pp. 1