Thursday, November 8, 2012: 1:15 PM-2:45 PM
Chesapeake (Sheraton Baltimore City Center Hotel)
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
Organizers: Tracy Yandle, Emory University
Moderators: Evan Ringquist, Indiana University
Chairs: Mark Imperial, University of North Carolina at Wilmington
Within the environmental policy and natural resource management community, market-based or “cap and trade” programs have long attracted academic attention as a solution to common-pool resource dilemmas. However, in recent years, they are also attracting attention from the regulatory community. In fisheries management, these programs are known as ITQs or “catch shares” in the United States. In 2010, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a new catch share policy stating “To achieve long-term ecological and economic sustainability of the Nation’s fishery resources and fishing communities, NOAA encourages the consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever appropriate …” However, when and where this management approach is appropriate is not always clear. As cap and trade programs move solidly into the realm of practice, it is vital to carefully assess existing programs and draw lessons for the development of future programs.
This panel presents three papers and five cases of ITQ-type fisheries management systems in the United States where this approach is relatively novel and in New Zealand where they have been national policy for 25 years. Careful attention is paid to the long-term economic and institutional implications of this management approach. Two papers compare this management approach across locations, and the third examines the long-term institutional implications of ITQs through time. Together these papers and ensuing discussion present a nuanced discussion of the complexity surrounding the introduction and long-term use of ITQs.