*Names in bold indicate Presenter
In this paper I discuss how state officials in Louisiana opposed a federally funded project without publicly opposing it. They were able to do so by using legitimate rules, those that had been designed for the implementation of similar projects. The application of rules to a project depends upon the story that gives structure to the project. Is it a capital construction project or a service provision? What are the goals of the project and what is the targeted population? In justifying the use of rules, state officials constructed stories about the project. To do so they not only actively reframed the project in terms of economics and efficiency, but they also used the language of the application itself to promote ambiguity about the goals. I discuss how officials in power positions were able to narrate power and use the instruments of external control, rules, as instruments of internal control.
This paper has implications not only in terms of the feasibility of rules as independent, context-free instruments of control, but also for questions about accountability.