Incentives, Constraints, and Landowner Participation in Voluntary Species Conservation Efforts
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
Using game theory and a stylized construct of the average participating landowner, we explore how these competing incentives, along with the structural constraints of the ESA and its implementing regulations, are likely to influence landowner decision-making as it pertains to voluntary conservation activities. We begin by reviewing expected landowner behavior under the July 2014 policy as proposed and the ESA as it exists today. Next, we consider how landowner participation in voluntary conservation activities can be enhanced through minor adjustments to the Act’s implementing regulations, thus increasing the scale of conservation activity undertaken. Finally, we examine landowner decision-making under a wholly reimagined approach for conserving species, one that is designed to maximize the benefit to landowners for both reporting species occurrence and working towards their conservation and recovery. We will conclude with a discussion of the importance of understanding landowner behavior in the presence of specific incentives and constraints when developing new policy or reforming existing laws or regulations.
- ESA_Incentives_16Sep15-CleanDraft.pdf (251.6KB)