Panel Paper: Tenure Reform in New York City: Do More Rigorous Standards Improve Teacher Effectiveness?

Thursday, November 3, 2016 : 3:20 PM
Columbia 6 (Washington Hilton)

*Names in bold indicate Presenter

Aliza Husain1, Susanna Loeb2, Luke C. Miller1 and James Wyckoff1, (1)University of Virginia, (2)Stanford University


A recent reform in New York City’s teacher tenure process provides an unusual opportunity to learn about the role of tenure in teachers’ career outcomes and effectiveness. While almost all eligible teachers in NYCDOE were approved for tenure during their third year prior to the change, after the 2009-10 reform about 35 percent of probationary teachers being considered for tenure had their probationary periods extended. We investigate how the more rigorous tenure process in New York City influenced teacher effectiveness by addressing the following research questions:

1)  How did tenure rates change following the reform?

2)  Did extended teachers voluntarily exit at higher rates, and if so, were their replacements more or less effective?

3)  Did performance improve for teachers whose probationary periods were extended if they continued to teach? What were the ultimate tenure decisions for these teachers?

To answer these questions, we examine tenure decisions from 2007-2008 through 2013-2014. We also compare the effectiveness of teachers who were extended but left teaching in 2010-2011, 2011-2012, or 2012-2013, with teachers who replaced them. We then use a difference-in-differences framework to compare the effectiveness (indicated primarily by teacher value-added) of the “approved-for-tenure” teachers before and after the reform, with the effectiveness of extended teachers, who continued to teach, before and after the reform. We use teacher and student data from NYCDOE and the New York State Education Department.  

This research builds on our previous work which had been limited in its design due to data constraints. Preliminary analysis shows that the reform led to fewer teachers receiving tenure, and those not receiving tenure typically had their probationary periods extended to allow them an opportunity to demonstrate teaching effectiveness. We also find that extended teachers were substantially more likely than other teachers to leave their schools. We note that the voluntary attrition of less effective teachers would only benefit students if relatively more effective teachers replaced them. Preliminary results suggest that there are substantial differences in the effectiveness of extended leavers and their replacements. For example, estimated value-added in ELA is 20% of a standard deviation higher among the replacements than among the extended teachers who exit.

The evidence presented in this paper has important implications for the current debate regarding reforms to the tenure process, e.g., the Vergara v. California court case. Although not nearly as provocative as the elimination of tenure, modest reforms to the tenure process may produce many of the outcomes raised by plaintiffs in Vergara and other court cases as reasons for elimination of tenure. Adopting tenure reform similar to that presented here may be comparatively easy relative to other human resource policies that require more controversial policy changes.