Panel Paper:
Communities and Long-Term Risk Management for Natural Hazards: Understanding the Role of Local Government Administrators
Friday, November 4, 2016
:
9:10 AM
Albright (Washington Hilton)
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
The challenge for local governments in managing natural hazards generally and addressing changes in hazard vulnerability due to a changing climate in particular, are significant. Standard collective action problems seemingly apply for proactive engagement on hazards, including climate change issues. Likewise, classic delegation problems as explained by principal agent theory should also apply in the relationship between local elected officials and bureaucratic personnel. However, a number of cities in the U.S. display a wide range of innovation and initiation on climate mitigation and adaptation. This paper offers the suggestion that the collective action and principal agent problems are effectively resolved by bureaucratic policymaking where administrators are supported by elected officials, who reflect broad consensus on climate issues in some communities. Elected officials sometimes act jointly with implementing agents to promote policy innovation and change through broad grants of discretionary authority. I use evidence from a national survey of local government administrators (administrators randomly sampled from 115 cities and counties across the United States) on the topic of community hazard management practices, including the issue of climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The evidence points to a relationship between greater discretionary autonomy and choices elected principals make to support a specific policy goal. The implication is that meso-level bureaucrats function as partners in policy entrepreneurship and as key agents of policy innovation and change.
