Panel Paper:
Does Conduit Financing Reduce Borrowing Costs of Local Governments?
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
The emergence and existence of this type of conduit is profoundly historical and political. One reason for this is informational asymmetry in the municipal bond market. The disclosure requirements of the municipal bond market are weaker than the corporate bond market, and plenty of small issuers are less known by municipal bond investors. Although bond pooling provided by conduits is supposed to lower borrowing costs, most bonds issued by JPAs finance a single local agency. Therefore, it is important to investigate the incentives for these local agencies to use conduits instead of arm’s-length investors. As a matter of fact, during the borrowing process, the JPA is a type of financial intermediary that can reorganize small issues more efficiently. Hence, sophisticated local agencies with strong fiscal backgrounds prefer to borrow directly from the credit market under their name. To avoid selection bias, a two-stage selection model will be used. The first stage identifies which local agencies will utilize the direct bond issuing method. That is: what drives local agencies to use conduit? And the second stage examines whether interest and issuance costs are significantly reduced. Importantly, in my work, long- and short-term debts are analyzed separately. Moreover, to my knowledge, there are very few studies that consider the influence of CF on local government borrowing costs. My research, which draws chiefly on data from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC), seeks to bridge this gap.