Panel Paper: When Are Union Transitions Bad for Children? Variation By Fathers' and Mothers' Risk

Monday, June 13, 2016 : 11:50 AM
Clement House, 3rd Floor, Room 07 (London School of Economics)

*Names in bold indicate Presenter

Elizabeth Karberg, Child Trends/Research Scientist, Natasha Cabrera, University of Maryland and Justin Dyer, Birmingham Young University
Introduction. Congress authorized $75 million to support the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiatives in 2004, based upon arguments that “children who grow up in an intact, two-parent family with both biological parents present do better on a wide range of outcomes than children who grow up in a single-parent family,’ Berlin (2004). Funding for this program, which was increased and reauthorized in 2011, is likely to be debated again when Congress reauthorizes TANF.  This debate should be informed by evidence about why family stability promotes child-wellbeing, but so far such evidence is extremely limited.

Research suggests that family instability is bad for children because it decreases the amount of father involvement (Tach et al., 20210), which disrupts the father-child relationship resulting in increased externalizing behavior problems (EPB). However, this perspective ignores the tremendous variability among fathers and the way fathers interact with their children (Cabrera et al., 2007). The departure of high-risk fathers might be beneficial for children whereas the departure of fathers with minimal risk might have a negative effect on children’s EPB (Geller et al., 2009). Drawing on the risk/resiliency framework, we ask:  (1) what are the associations between family instability during the first years of life and children’s EPB at age 5? (2) How do mothers’ and fathers’ economic and psychological risk factors and mother and father involvement moderate the association between family instability and child EPB? 

Data & Methods Using the first four waves of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS, N=4898), we construct a complete case sample of children with resident and nonresident fathers. Then we estimate OLS regression models to examine the differential effects of union instability on children’s EPB.  Our key independent variable was union instability (number of transitions: parents break up, mothers re-partner). Our moderators were: mothers’ and fathers’ involvement, mothers’ and fathers’ psychological risk (depression), and economic risk (education, welfare). Our dependent variable was children’s EPB at age 5.

Preliminary Findings Our findings show that family instability had no significant direct effect on children’s EPB. However, family instability had a significant negative effect on children’s EPB when mothers had less economic risk (imore education) (B=-.11, p<.05). In contrast, family instability had a significant positive effect on children’s EPB when fathers’ psychological risk (depression) was high (B=.17, P<.001) and when mother involvement was low (B=.14, <.05). Levels of father involvement or father’s economic risk did not moderate the association between family instability and children’s EPB.

Implications. Our preliminary results suggest that the effects of family instability on children’s EPB depend on the levels of risk of each parent. Mothers’ low level of economic risk serves as a buffer or protective factor against the negative effects of family instability. In contrast, fathers’ psychological risk tends to exacerbate the negative effect of family instability on children’s EPB. Moreover, it is lower levels of maternal involvement rather than father involvement that pose a risk factor for children when there is family instability.