Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Military strategists have debated the conditions under which a U.S. administration will authorize conventional strikes on Chinese mainland targets in a Sino-U.S. war. Neither side of the debate has provided empirical evidence though. I therefore propose using a scenario-based survey of U.S. foreign policy elites—in addition to historical case studies, elite interviews, and an actual wargame—to study the factors relevant to a mainland strike decision and the impact of these factors on the likelihood of permission for mainland strikes.

Historical cases studies of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Kargil Crisis will shed light on crudely analogous historical episodes in which leaders considered strikes on or near the homeland of a nuclear adversary. In-depth interviews of modern foreign policy elites will provide insight into the factors that elites consider and aid in my development of a survey. Finally, a wargame with U.S. foreign policy elites that involves a future-U.S. China conflict will help simulate the time pressure and group dynamics likely to be found in a future crisis.

If a future administration denies permission for mainland strikes, U.S. victory in a war against China is less likely and will result in higher U.S. casualties.  Moreover, war plans and acquisition priorities might require readjustment if generals and admirals come to believe that permission for mainland strikes is less than guaranteed.