Counterinsurgency and Internal Strife Negligence: Case Study of failed Counterinsurgency in Kashmir-India
Friday, April 7, 2017 : 11:05 AM
Founders Hall Room 475 (George Mason University Schar School of Policy)
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
Internal strife over real estate has led to different levels of violence and perpetual conflict caused by armed groups and radically charged terrorist organizations that in turn has led to the advent of a series of counterinsurgencies and in most cases, failed counterinsurgencies. With countless efforts of weak and short-lived counterinsurgency is most prevalent in the case of Kashmir-India. In order to probe the counterinsurgent tactics that in this case has generally failed, this paper draws from literature and successful tactics for a way forward. The purpose of this paper is to examine the underlying politics in Kashmir with armed violence and its involvement in politics and counterinsurgency used during times. Overall, the question is: Is there an increase in violence when the Indian government employed primarily heavy-handed tactics in counterinsurgency compared to times where there were political negotiations and compromises? The time period of concern will be 1997-1998 where they had a list of insurgencies including 1997 Sangrampora massacre, Wandhama Massacre, 1998 Prankote massacre, and 1998 Champanari massacre. This lead to Operation Sadbhavana (Operation Goodwill) which was launched by the Northern Command of the Indian Army in 1998. This was a unique initiative with the Indian army concerned with the conduct of intense Counter Terrorism operations was also actively assisting civil administration to bring back normalcy through political negotiation. This will be compared to current day Kashmir, post the death of prominent Kashmiri militant, Burhan Wani which has led to turmoil and increased insurgencies throughout Kashmir and in this case the Indian government has employed primarily heavy-handed tactics. This paper will draw parallels between the variation in violence and politics over time in Kashmir to the case of Northern Ireland. Finally, I will validate implications for effective counterinsurgency tactics (hardline counter-insurgency approach and less repressive counterinsurgency) and assess the future of the use of violence in politics in Jammu Kashmir.