Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Since the United States began investing in governance and development in Afghanistan in 2002, resource constraints have always meant that decisions about where to invest have had tradeoffs. An investment in one village or government seat comes at the cost of an investment in another. Yet, where to prioritize is not doctrinally prescribed. I use qualitative interviews with civilian and military leaders on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in adjacent provinces but across a regional command boundary (Ghazni and Zabul) to develop a generalizable understanding of this prioritization process and to identify conditions that influence project emplacement.

I organize my analysis to distinguish between conditions that constrain or support projection away from population centers or the main highway. I find that maximizing benefits for Afghans, supporting Afghan provincial leaders, and unifying U.S. agency priorities constrained projection while valuing geographic equity for Afghans, leveraging Afghan local leadership, tolerating financial inefficiency, and separating U.S. agency objectives supported projection. These ground-level conditions illuminate unanticipated consequences of logical principles that are relevant for strategic-level reforms seeking to improve counterinsurgency and stabilization outcomes.