Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Drawing on a 17-year panel data consisting of 13 municipal governments in Rizal province, Philippines, this research examines the effect of political dynasties on local public social services expenditure. Particularly, the study investigates the effect of political dynasties as a homogeneous group, but more importantly, as two (2) distinct categories—as fat and thin political dynasties, respectively. Based from the results of Panel-corrected Prais–Winsten Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation, this working paper finds that dynastic (fat and thin) municipal governments in Rizal invest LESS on social services, compared with their non-dynastic counterparts. Further, when disaggregated into the two categories, political dynasties exhibit diverging effects on social services expenditure. On the average, results show that fat municipal governments in Rizal invest LESS, while a thin dynastic municipal government invests MORE on their respective constituents, both being compared with a common base group—the non-dynastic municipal governments. At the theoretical front, the findings of this working paper reinforce the fat dynasties as “Roving Bandits” and thin dynasties as “Stationary Bandits” view of political dynasties. On a public policy level, the study’s results have reverberating implications on the proposal for a total ban of political dynasties in the Philippines, as well as on other key policy areas, such as, term limits, yardstick competition, and political party reforms. Based from the findings, this research recommends for a regulation of political dynasties, rather than a total ban. On the one hand, prohibit fat dynasties wherein relatives occupy multiple elective positions simultaneously—thereby eroding proper checks-and-balances and compromising responsiveness and accountability of governance. On the other hand, allow thin dynasties wherein family members succeed each other in the same position sequentially. Although thin dynasties are also considered extractive political institutions like fat dynasties, they at least consider the long-term view of being at the office. Hence, they have the incentive to perform well in office and invest in their constituents to reinforce their reelection bids—aside from their influence and political and economic prowess.