Building evidence to inform local government decision making for immigrant incorporation in homogenous, bifurcated and multiethnic places

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Abstract

Although the Federal government is responsible for immigration policy, immigrant integration into the workforce and community happens through the work of local governments and non-governmental organizations. Recent scholarship has proposed that urban spatial structure influences whether local governments implement policy to incorporate immigrants which in turn shapes the context of reception. Specifically, some have argued that a bifurcated population (e.g., about half Hispanic and half Anglo), would be more likely to have immigrant friendly policy outcomes for immigrants than a multiethnic population (i.e., a mix of ethnicities and racialized populations but no majority), which in turn would be more likely to have immigrant friendly outcomes than a homogeneously Anglo population. However, the state of the literature is generally limited examine a small set of cases in depth, or to look at specific immigrant friendly or anti-immigrant ordinances as policy outcomes. This question is important for intergovernmental relationships (e.g., Federal requirements to support those with Limited English Proficiency) as well as community engagement. In order to build evidence to inform decision making, I conduct content analysis of annual reports from local governments (n=127) that participated in place-based community development initiatives submitted to the US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development from 1996 – 2008 to provide insight into this proposed relationship. First, I categorize these local governments as including immigrant-related projects or programs. Second, I categorize the neighborhoods designated within the local governments by type of spatial structure (i.e., homogenous, bifurcated, multiethnic) using census data for the designated areas. Then I test associations between having immigrant-related projects or programs and the designated neighborhoods’ spatial structures and population characteristics. I find that designated neighborhoods with increasing immigrant populations, Hispanic bifurcation, or homogeneously Hispanic were associated with local governments developing immigrant-related projects and programs. Homogeneously Hispanic and bifurcated Hispanic places had higher odds of immigrant friendly policy outcomes than multiethnic places. There were no statistically significant difference between multiethnic places and bifurcated Black/White, or homogeneously Black or White places. While this research is not generalizable outside the study population, it is consistent with the theory that bifurcated places are more likely to have immigrant-friendly policy outcomes. This research is also consistent with theory in that multiethnic places may not successfully form coalitions for change. In these instances, it may rest on the action of local government civil servants to respond to population changes. Implications for research, policy, and performance management dashboards are discussed. For example, the American Community Survey has annual updates of population data that could be used to visualize urban spatial structure against self-reported English language attainment to inform local decision making regarding immigrant integration.
Introduction

The purpose of this article is to show how immigration dynamics and urban spatial structure informs the planning and implementation of place-based community development policy at the local level. This paper brings together two lines of literature: one broadly about the relationship of enclaves, a type of urban spatial structure, and immigrant economic incorporation, the second about urban spatial structure (bifurcated, homogeneous, multiethnic), and local immigrant policies. Understanding the relationship of immigration and place is important because urban social policy has struggled with the trade-off between competing anti-poverty goals: on the one hand, targeting people in poverty wherever they may live, or targeting improvements to the built and social environment in specific places. One approach to revitalizing distressed inner-cities, the place-based initiative, focuses public and private investment inside a geographically bounded area that is usually high poverty (Ladd 1994). Place-based initiatives prioritize community building with comprehensive links to different sectors (e.g. business, education, health, social services) and levels (Kubisch et al. 2010). In contrast, other social policies assist people in poverty wherever they live (e.g., housing vouchers, public education, cash transfers), which may enable them to move to a different place (Spencer 2004). On the other hand, improving a low-income place may price low-income people out of the neighborhood, a process known as “gentrification” (Kubisch et al. 2010; Spencer 2004).

This study considers the role immigration in urban areas shapes the ways in which local governments can in turn shape the context of reception for immigrants\(^1\) in places targeted for revitalization. Some neighborhoods experience outmigration of the native born, resulting in a high level of vacancy, but become viable when they receive a flow of immigrants willing to recycle older housing stock (Kubisch et al. 2010; Muller 1993). Consequently, because non-
citizen residents are not eligible for certain social benefits, these neighborhoods may contain spatially concentrated mutual assistance. Place-based initiatives provide an opportunity to deliver voluntary services in one location in ways means-tested social benefits that includes citizenship and income as eligibility criteria cannot.

Social theory has articulated three key modes of immigrant incorporation relevant to shaping urban spatial structure through place-based initiatives: economic incorporation, political incorporation and bureaucratic incorporation. The three modes work together, but can have a different relative contribution to the process of incorporation. Debates about economic incorporation are typically articulated in the context of the ethnic enclave debate (Waldinger 1993): Are immigrants better off economically concentrated in a neighborhood or do they have better economic opportunity when spatially dispersed in a region? Specifically, Marcuse (1997) argues that the Empowerment Zone (EZ) approach to place-based initiatives makes sense for an immigrant enclave because enclaves have a concentration of social ties that can be drawn upon for mutual support for entrepreneurship. He argues that EZs make less sense for distressed urban neighborhoods that generally lack social organization, in particular the majority African-American Harlem in the New York EZ. Empirical literature on EZs have not gone back to see if Marcuse’s intuitions were found in implementation.

In terms of political incorporation, the issue of urban spatial structure has also been salient. Some scholars have argued that a bifurcated population (e.g., about half Hispanic and half Anglo), would have better policy outcomes for immigrants than a multiethnic population (i.e., no majority), which in turn would have better outcomes than a homogeneously Anglo population (Filomeno 2015; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Toussaint 2013). This body of work argues that what matters for incorporation is not just being in an ethnic enclave or dispersed, but the
relative size of the ethnic or racialized group compared to others in the region. These findings are typically are derived from single city case studies of local efforts to support immigrant entrepreneurship but they have not been tested across a national lens.

To test the applicability of urban spatial structure more broadly, this study leverages the rich documentation of projects and programs implemented locally as part of place-based initiatives administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 1994 – 2014, called Renewal Community, Empowerment Zone, and Enterprise Community (RC/EZ/EC) programs (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2013). It makes sense to use these as case studies because the Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) initiative launched in 1994, when the United States was experiencing "new immigration" to inner cities at unprecedented levels. This was in part due to the Immigration Act of 1990 which built upon the Hart Celler Act of 1964 (Tichenor 2002). In fact, in the 1990s the immigrant population increased 57% with some center cities like Miami becoming majority immigrant (Singer 2004). Although the EZ/EC regulations do not explicitly mention immigrants or minorities (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995, 1998), local governments could decide whether and how to adapt their development strategies to fit community strengths, such as networks of immigrant entrepreneurs or an immigrant labor force. Thus, the local polity could influence localized community development policy and implementation through economic, political or bureaucratic channels.

This paper contributes to the literature on place-based initiatives by showing how local governments developed immigrant-related projects and programs in the implementation of a high profile federal program. It also contributes by analyzing the way the local context shaped the projects and programs so as to inform implementation of future place-based initiatives, both
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public and private. The first section of this paper reviews the history and scholarship of the
RC/EZ/EC programs. The second section discusses theories of local immigrant incorporation in
the context of urban spatial structure. The third section tests associations between local
population contexts in RC/EZ/ECs and the odds of having immigrant-related projects. The paper
closes with recommendations that build upon the insights of Marcuse (1997): design of place-
based initiatives need to explicitly address urban spatial structure in selection, planning and
implementation with regard to the concentration and mix of race, ethnicity and nativity.

Literature Review

The History and Structure of the RC/EZ/EC Programs

**History.** In the 1980s, various levels of government adapted “enterprise zone” (EZ)
programs modeled after policies in the United Kingdom to revitalize economies in cities with
high poverty and unemployment. These place-based economic development policies originated
from Sir Peter Hall, who described them as "Non-plan free-for-all areas with no immigration
controls or other bureaucratic regulation" (as quoted in Lavin & Whysall, 2004, p. 220).
However, in general, national governments enacting such policies did not liberalize immigration
in these areas (Lavin and Whysall 2004). In 1994, HUD designated six Empowerment Zones
(EZs)\(^5\) and 65 Enterprise Communities (ECs) (Lavin and Whysall 2004). Scholars noted that the
EZ/EC combined features of the community based Model Cities program with those of the
business-oriented enterprise zone (Hetzel 1994; Wallace 2004). In 1997, HUD designated 15
additional EZs with smaller economic development grants and tax incentives that began in 2001.
Later in 2001, HUD (2013) designated eight Round III EZs, which ended in 2014, and 40
Renewal Communities (RCs), which ended in 2009 and only offered tax incentives as a benefit.
EZ/ECs were expected to leverage private funding, such as foundations who were funding
capacity building as part of a Comprehensive Community Initiative (CCI) (O’Connor 1999). These foundations (e.g., Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Packard Foundation, and the Aspen Institute) promoted a theory of change model of implementation and evaluation (Coulton and Hollister 1998; Milligan et al. 1998). These private monies provided an opportunity to serve constituencies, such as immigrants, who may not be eligible for means tested benefits requiring citizenship.

**Selection Procedures.** Eligibility criteria for EZs and RCs required that most census tracts have at least 20% poverty and high unemployment, subject to certain population and area constraints (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2013). Because the criteria included size caps, local governments needed to select from otherwise eligible distressed neighborhoods based on available community partnerships. In the EZ/EC program, local governments worked with community-based organizations to prepare strategic plans as specified by HUD (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995). HUD’s designation of EZs included a subjective assessment of the strategic plan, or in the case of the RC, the course of action. This course of action required input from one community-based organization, but that could be one business. As a consequence, EZ/ECs had richer detail in strategic planning and reporting.

In the EZ/EC program, local governments prepared a strategic plan with substantial participation from neighborhood residents and other stakeholders (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1995). The first part of the plan was required to articulate a *strategic vision for change*. The second part required a community asset assessment in order to develop *community-based partnerships* from government, businesses, religious organizations, environmental groups, and individual citizens. Immigrants and minorities were not mentioned...
explicitly in this section of the regulation, but regulations did articulate that community
organizations should represent residents. The third section, *economic opportunity*, was to
highlight entrepreneurship, access to capital, and job creation activities. Finally, the fourth
section, *sustainable community development*, included provisions to clean up brownfields, use
renewable energy, build affordable housing, provide social services, and improve transportation.
These EZ/EC principles echo the concept of institutional completeness found in Breton (1964)
and the comprehensive lens described in Kubisch, Auspos, Brown, and Dewar (2010). However,
Marcuse (1997) warns that for African-American neighborhoods surviving a legacy of
institutionalized segregation, a place-based approach through tax incentives could only serve to
further spatial separation.

**Benefits.** Benefits have changed with each of the three rounds (U. S. Department of
received more benefits than ECs and RCs. Because EZ/ECs issued grants to community-based
organizations for broader services, they had more opportunities to involve a broad constituency
and were required to leverage matching resources. Various tax incentives (e.g., wage credits,
capital gains exclusions, equipment expensing, tax free bonds) went to businesses in the EZ or
RC provided a tax liability existed. The wage credit was made available to employers that had
employees who lived and worked in the EZ or RC. The logic of the incentive was that if
businesses saved money they could pass benefits to employees. However, they were targeted
geographically, but not explicitly targeted to minority or immigrant firms. Because
documentation of employee home address is needed to take wage credits, they may not have
appealed to those who hired workers informally.

**Scholarship on RC/EZ/ECs**
The literature on RC/EZ/ECs has focused primarily on three areas: a) the selection process and the relative influence of political factors over time (Wallace 2004) b) the relationship of communities to the governance of the EZs as they evolved from application to implementation (Chaskin 2003; Dávila 2004; Gittell and Newman 1998); or c) quasi-experimental designs that estimate the impact of the RC/EZ/EC policy treatment on jobs, real estate, poverty or other business outcomes. For a good summary see Smith (2015, 2016). With regard to impact of the program, HUD's official impact study noted a positive impact on minority businesses, but did not distinguish immigrant businesses (Hebert et al. 2001). Other outcome studies have not focused on the role of immigrants in these programs, but a framework that articulates the relationship between the immigrant ethnic enclave, broader urban spatial structure, and the potential for place-based initiatives may be found in Marcuse (1997).

After designation of the Round I Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, Marcuse (1997) criticized the assumption that tax incentives for hiring local residents could revitalize a high-poverty area. For Marcuse, the spatial concentration of an ethnic group could be voluntary (i.e., an enclave) or involuntary (i.e., a ghetto). The mechanism of coercion could be legal, cultural or economic. Ethnic residential patterns may be dissolved (i.e., assimilated or suppressed), mixed (multicultural or desegregated), or isolated (monocultural or segregated). Historically, mainstream institutions and businesses have driven minorities into less desirable areas and jobs through law or discrimination (Light and Rosenstein 1995; Portes 1998). Marcuse (1997) gave examples from New York City, where a ghetto, such as Harlem, was an involuntary spatial concentration of disadvantage, in contrast to an enclave, such as Chinatown, which had the positive value of providing a site for ethnic identity.
Local Immigrant Incorporation and Community Development

The relationship between immigrants and community development, specifically inner city neighborhood revitalization, has been the subject of scholarly and technical literature. For example, Winnick (1990) argues that changes to immigration policy (e.g., family reunification and visas for English speakers) in the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 led to the “New Immigration” and increased the immigrant population. This led to the revitalization of some inner city neighborhoods that had been experiencing disinvestment, in particular Brooklyn’s Sunset Park.

A similar argument is made by Muller (1993), who introduced the concept of the “Gateway City”. He attributes the decline of former immigrant gateways such as Detroit, Baltimore, and Cleveland in part to caps imposed on immigration during the 1920s. On the other hand, the economic growth of Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Washington, and Chicago are in part due to Hart-Celler because immigrants are willing to live in smaller housing stock, be self-employed, and work in labor-intensive industries with irregular hours. Immigrants in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston and elsewhere have contributed to population growth, entrepreneurship, and neighborhood revitalization despite barriers (Bowles and Colton 2007). The supply of immigrants nationally is controlled, however imperfectly, by the federal government, but a variety of factors, including local policy context, can influence an immigrant’s decision on where to live.

The literature on immigrant incorporation considers the receiving community context, ethnic group characteristics, and organizational capacity (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). In classic immigrant incorporation theory on the nation state, political incorporation (i.e., voting rights and political representation) preceded social rights (Marshall 1964). Indeed, local governments might pursue immigrant political incorporation when responding to an organized
pro-immigration constituency, assuming elected officials were vote maximizing (Freeman 1995). The phrase, *coethnic resources*, has been used to refer to political and social resources shared by those with a common identity (Alba and Nee 1997; Bloemraad 2006; Zolberg 1999). This literature informs the understanding of the role of elected officials in setting the boundaries and governance structure in the RC/EZ/EC (Gittell and Newman 1998; Wallace 2004) in that through solidarity, immigrants may have shaped the RC/EZ/EC process by activating coethnic resources in an enclave.

**Economic Incorporation: Ethnic Enclave Debate**

One side of the ethnic enclave debate argues that social exclusion from mainstream institutions reduce chances of assimilation and upward income mobility (Waldinger 1993). Members of a particular ethnic group can meet their needs without having to use mainstream institutions in an enclave given the level of social capital and institutional completeness (Breton 1964) that comes from having co-ethnic schools, employers, media, and financing. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) argued that immigrants in a hostile context rely on the social capital of bounded solidarity: a sense of belonging between people of the same class or ethnic group formed due to exclusionary practices by a dominant class. For example, Chinatowns in Manhattan (Zhou 2004) and the Cuban enclave in Miami are examples of ethnic enclaves emerging under conditions of bounded solidarity (Portes 1987).

Other scholars disagree that ethnic enclaves are beneficial, arguing that co-ethnic employees exploit their workers and pay them less (Waldinger 1993). Furthermore, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) also note negative effects of social capital, including unwanted obligations to the community, constraints on freedom, and pressure among lower class immigrants to avoid being too successful. Recent work suggests that enclaves are not necessarily beneficial to lower
class immigrants, finding that Asians and Hispanics working in non-English speaking environments have reduced wages (Xie and Gough 2011). Menjívar (2000) extends this analysis of how class and gender shape opportunities for immigrants.

Immigrant Political and Bureaucratic Incorporation

Others have argued that coethnic resources available in an enclave are not a sufficient condition for local incorporation because political and policy outcomes vary by legal context and culture over time in civil society. At the national level, Zolberg (1999) argued that pro-immigrant incorporation policies are set when labor, faith institutions, and business form a coalition around a common concern for immigrant workers. However, Brubaker (2001) noted some European countries shifted away from a “right to difference” policy framework that encouraged cultural continuity with the sending country to assimilation policies in order to promote equal opportunity. He concluded that a normative desire to provide civic incorporation may correspond with heterogeneous assimilation pathways. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) argued that the U.S. facilitates immigrant incorporation more quickly than Europe because of its immigrant history, civil rights movement, decentralized welfare state, and open political contests. In other words, organizing and political lessons learned by one ethnic group are used by others to pressure the state for resources and to run candidates for office. This literature suggests that immigrant coethnic resources, are important but not sufficient for building constituencies in civil society that in turn could influence the development of an EZ.

On the other hand, local governments may be reluctant to incorporate immigrants if the context of reception and spatial configuration of African-Americans, Latinos, and Asian immigrants lead to a phenomenon called “group threat or conflict” (Jones-Correa 2001; Marrow 2008). This newer work draws on theories of political incorporation that describe how a
multiracial progressive coalition can lead to civic incorporation evidenced by city employment, membership in commissions, and minority business programs (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986). It also shows that Hispanics in California case studies tended to be less spatially concentrated than Blacks and only achieved incorporation with participation from Whites or Blacks. Marrow (2008) extends this theory in North Carolina, a place with a rapidly increasing Hispanic population in smaller cities and rural areas with established relationships between Whites and Blacks but had not previously experienced immigration. She added to this literature found that where Hispanics and African Americans are both in the minority, they may form coalitions to gain political power, but where African Americans are in the majority, they may see Hispanics as a group threat (Marrow 2008).

For example, there is mixed evidence that the relative size of a group is associated with passage of pro- and anti-immigrant ordinances (Hopkins 2010; O’Neil 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Unlike Marrow (2008), these three studies do not attempt to observe group threat directly as part of an ethnography, but rather as a measure of potential for contact or conflict, based on relative racial and ethnic group size. For example, O'Neil (2010), hypothesized that the ratio of Hispanic to Black populations would be associated with the passage of an anti-immigrant ordinance, but it was not significant. Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) hypothesized that differences between Black and Latino poverty rates, and White and Latino poverty rates, would be associated with passage of a pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant ordinance, but neither were significant. In a slight departure, Hopkins (2010) argued that rising local unemployment increases the odds of a local government passing an anti-immigration ordinance for communities with high levels of immigration; but rising unemployment lowers the odds for communities with average or lower levels of immigration.
Some recent scholars have developed a typology drawn from election literature serves as a working model to analyze case study research (Filomeno, 2016; Good, 2005; Toussaint, 2013). In summary, local policy (both passage and implementation), are shaped by the degree to which a local population is homogeneous, bifurcated (i.e., biracial), or multiethnic (i.e., heterogeneous). A homogeneous population is mostly, but not exclusively of one race or ethnicity. A bifurcated population is one where there are two radicalized or ethnic populations about equal in size and no other group comes close. A multiethnic population is one where are more than two ethnic or racialized populations and none of them form a majority. Both Filomeno (2016) and Good (2005) find that a bifurcated population has better local policy outcomes for immigrants than a homogeneously white or a multiethnic population. This is in sharp contrast to the findings of the state-level work from which the concept of bifurcation draws.

They adapted the concept of bifurcation from Tolbert & Hero (1996) and Hero & Tolbert (1996). This is rooted in a social diversity perspective articulated by Putnam (2000) that policy and equity outcomes are shaped by relative population sizes. However, these articles measure bifurcation as a joint measure of white diversity (Anglo vs. ethnic white) as well as racial diversity. Tolbert & Hero (1996) investigates state-level election to find that the passage of Proposition 187, a law that prohibited certain services to immigrants out of status, and finds consistent with a social diversity perspective, that counties that were bifurcated likely stimulated group threat and drove white votes in favor of the initiative. Note that this is simply an observation based on the descriptive classification of the counties. Indeed the multivariate analysis in Tolbert & Hero (1996) simply regresses continuous population characteristics (Percent Latino, Percent Black, Percent Asian, Percent White, Unemployment Rate, Percent Registered Republican).
Finally, local incorporation may occur through *bureaucratic incorporation*: civil servants, such as police, planners, and social workers, draw upon their respective professional missions to reach out to immigrant populations (Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Marrow 2009). Previous studies have provided evidence that bureaucratic incorporation may be plausibly linked to the RC/EZ/EC program. For example, Gittell et al. (1998) noted the involvement of not only local elected officials and community members in the launch of an EZ/EC, but also expert consultants and community development professionals employed by the local government. As the program evolved, there may have been more opportunities for local government bureaucrats to develop immigrant-related projects and programs.

**Why the Immigration Literature Informs RC/EZ/ECs**

The immigration literature informs the RC/EZ/EC program, given conflicting priorities between Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos documented in Dávila (2004), a case study of the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone. Dávila argued that the EZ only provided tokenistic outreach about business assistance to Latino communities—for example, in the form of flyers posted near ATM machines. To date, no one has analyzed systematically the relationship of population characteristics to immigrant incorporation in all RC/EZ/ECs.

Some of the literature on the selection of EZ boundaries discusses the role of immigrants and their potential political influence in the local selection of neighborhoods. First, Gittell, et al. (1998), suggested that local elected officials played the most important role in boundary selection prior to submission, while Wallace (2004) noted the influence of the Congressional House Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Rep. Charles Rangel of Upper Manhattan, in preparing the eligibility criteria. Because this area has a strong immigrant constituency, it is
plausible that immigrant voters could influence boundary selection through the political process, but this has not explicitly been addressed in the literature.

Furthermore, Gittell et al. (1998) also compared the role of organizations representing new immigrants such as Latinos with those representing African Americans in the development of projects and programs across Round I EZ/ECs. Specifically, in Camden, Latinos organized for a seat on the governance board of the EZ. In Chicago, however, Gittell et al. (1998) argues that Mayor Daley increased mistrust between African-American organizations on the South Side and Latino neighborhoods on the north side during the development of the EZ strategic plan. In Detroit, business and institutional interests appeared to dominate the coordinating council that drafted the strategic plan, with only two seats given to African-American residents and one to a Latino resident (Gittell et al., 1998). In an analysis of the Boston EC, Chaskin (2003) observed how the legitimacy of a community initiative might be strengthened by diversity; however, different organizations might have conflict rooted in class and ethnicity. In the Boston case, new immigration changed the identity of homogenous ethnic enclaves in the EC. During strategic planning for the EC, representatives from four ethnic and racial groups participated equitably on the Community Advisory Board, and influence shifted towards city staff during the implementation phase (Hebert et al. 2001).

In summary, the ability of immigrants to form a multiethnic coalition to promote incorporation also varies by the context of reception. In RC/EZ/ECs, political interests, neighborhood interests, ethnic interests and businesses interests played roles in developing EZ strategic plans and implementation that varied by site. Despite the absence of a Federal requirement, it is plausible that though a community process the planning and implementation
choices could be “pro-immigrant”. This study can make progress by comparing the relative influence of spatial concentration (i.e., an enclave) with the

RQ1: Did the spatial concentration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in enclaves increase the odds of “pro-immigrant” implementation?

Because HUD required extensive reporting, it is possible to observe the existence of immigrant-related projects and programs. Because HUD required, for the most part, that RC/EZ/ECs follow Census tract boundaries, it is possible to know the demographics of the designated area. Given Marcuse’s (1997) observation about the strength of immigrant enclaves, one might expect that those RC/EZ/ECs with ethnic enclaves would develop immigrant-related projects and programs. This paper tests the hypotheses that the odds of a local government developing immigrant-related projects and programs are positively associated with coethnic resources and negatively associated with relative group size, holding other variables constant. These questions are important to the literature on place-based initiatives because ethnic and immigrant communities are known to have relationships to neighborhood change and local economies. Understanding the general pattern of adoption of immigrant-related projects and programs as well as details regarding specific ones can better inform future iterations of place-based policy.

It is also possible that the relative groups size facilitated implementation though some kind of political incorporation or conversely, a political threat blocked any pro-immigrant implementation.

RQ2: Is relative ethnic group size associated with the odds of having “pro-immigrant” RC/EZ/EC implementation?
Following Marrow (2008) and Filomeno (2015), I hypothesize that a homogenous Black or White RC/EZ/EC would have lower odds of developing immigrant-related activities than a bifurcated RC/EZ/EC. Following Filomeno (2016) and Good (2005), I hypothesize that a multiethnic RC/EZ/EC has lower odds of developing immigrant-related activities than a bifurcated RC/EZ/EC.

Methods

To analyze the determinants of immigrant-related projects and programs, first I present descriptive statistics of the RC/EZ/ECs. Next, I estimate a multivariate logistic regression model, adding other population variables, relative group size and control variables. Finally, specific cases are examined in depth to give examples of specific immigrant-related projects and to determine whether instances of bureaucratic incorporation may have occurred. The unit of analysis is the urban RC/EZ/EC, which is a set of U.S. census tracts, selected by state and local governments before designation by HUD (n = 127).6

Data

Information on RC/EZ/EC implementation plans and annual reports was taken from the HUD Office of Community Renewal (2013) website. Census data are from the National Neighborhood Change Database (Tatian and Kingsley 2003), and metropolitan area industry-mix data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011). Nonprofit variables at the county level are from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute (Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy 2009)7.

Measures
Dependent variable. The outcome in this study is whether an RC/EZ/EC had an activity targeted to immigrants as evidenced by presence of an implementation plan or narrative description in the annual reports submitted to HUD (1=Yes, 0=No). An implementation plan is the technical term for the description of a project or program in the RC/EZ/EC performance dashboard. This variable does not attempt to measure the quality, success, or magnitude of the immigrant-related activity. To generate this variable, I searched each implementation plan and narrative portion of the annual report using the following keywords: “immigrant,” “foreign,” “refugee,” “minority,” “black,” “Hispanic,” “Asian,” and names of new immigrant groups (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2007:53–56). I read each occurrence in context (e.g. the entire paragraph or project plan) to eliminate false positives. Annual reports from high-immigration RC/EZ/ECs not identified using these keyword search terms noted were read in depth to screen for false negatives. Examples of immigrant-related projects range from multilingual marketing of tax incentives to targeted workforce development, partnerships with immigrant-serving organizations, and assistance to immigrant businesses. Newspaper articles, interviews with stakeholders, and other web-based sources of information provided supplementary data to understand the context.

Independent variables. In general, these variables are from the 1990 Census data because HUD required use of 1990 data to determine eligibility for designation, exceptions noted. This provides time ordering with the dependent variable. These are drawn from the literature and represent three concepts: 1) economic incorporation and ethnic enclaves; 2) political incorporation, and 3) control variables.

First, I use immigrant or ethnic concentration as a proxy measure for an enclave as a site of bounded solidarity and coethnic resources. Immigrant or ethnic concentration is measured as
the proportion of subpopulation (i.e., foreign-born, African-American, Asian-American, Hispanic/Latino) in the RC/EZ/EC, divided by the metro area proportion of the subgroup (Liu 2009). Scholars have used different ratios to use as a proxy for presence of an enclave. For example, Brown and Chung (2006), use 1.2 for analysis of a single, low-immigration metropolitan area. In contrast, Liu (2009) recommends using an immigrant concentration greater than or equal to 2 when studying multiple metropolitan areas with different levels of immigration. Therefore, I follow Liu (2009) and use 2 as a cut off. If the concentration is below 2 for each subpopulation, I follow Marcuse (1997) and classify this RC/EZ/EC as “dissolved” (n = 1). If more than one subpopulation is greater than 2 (i.e., has a probability of having an enclave), I classify it as “mixed” (n=85), and if there is only one, “isolated” (n=41). I do not attempt to distinguish between involuntary and voluntary concentration. While important, this would require contextual information about each local population not readily available. Because these spatial variables (i.e., dissolved, mixed, isolated) are collinear, they are not included in the multivariate model. Because economic incorporation in enclaves are shaped also by the labor market, the percentage point change in foreign-born (1990-1980, 2000-1990) in the RC/EZ/EC captures trends in the available immigrant labor market. It is not sufficient to observe enclaves because an immigrant population may be increasing, for example, but diffused across the region. The leading measure of percentage point change in foreign-born (2000-1999) is included because local government planners may have had data to indicate an increasing immigrant population that may have led them to engage in bureaucratic incorporation prior to organization of the immigrants into voting blocs. The measure of civil society is the number of ethnic and immigrant organizations (P84)\(^{10}\) per 10,000 persons in the county. These organizations are formally
incorporated and are a mix of those led by native-born serving immigrants and those run by immigrants and is a proxy for institutional completeness (Breton 1964).

Second, to examine the role of political incorporation, I create a set of variables drawn from the literature to measure relative group size to get at relative political strength. I take a simple approach, and first create a variable to indicate whether the RC/EZ/EC has a Black majority, White majority or Hispanic majority. One limitation of this measure is that it does not necessarily imply the existence of a multiracial coalition or actual conflict between specific populations: it is a global proxy measure of relative population size. Next, I distinguish whether that population is bifurcated, homogenous, or multiracial.

In the aforementioned literature, a bifurcated region is about half Anglo white and half minority population with a dominant minority. To operationalize bifurcation, initially Hero & Tolbert (1996) use the Sullivan (1973) index of minority diversity, a variant of the Simpson Index ($SI = 1 - \%P_1^2 + \%P_2^2 + \ldots \%P_n^2$ where P is an ethnic or racialized population of interest). By Hero (2003) minority diversity is measured as the percentage minority. To my knowledge, the only scholar to operationalize bifurcation post-Hero and Tolbert is Toussaint (2013). Toussaint (2013) operationalizes “homogenous” as a jurisdiction with at least a 60% majority Anglo white population. I follow Toussaint (2003) and use a 60% cut off for homogeneity (Homogenous Black = 54, Homogenous Hispanic = 12, Homogenous White = 9). There were no Asian majority RC/EZ/ECs.

Heterogeneous regions are characterized by the presence of multiple, more or less equally-sized racial/ethnic groups. Bifurcated regions have a relatively equal-sized Anglo and minority population, but, unlike multiethnic localities, one minority group is significantly larger than the others (Toussaint, 2013). The literature does not provide guidance to distinguish
between bifurcated and multiethnic, so I operationalize a *bifurcated* area as one where the second largest group is no more than ten percentage points greater than the largest (i.e., the majority or plurality group). The remaining RC/EZ/ECs I classify as *multiethnic*. For partisanship, I include the percentage of area represented by a Democratic U.S. member of Congress at the time of designation. Please see Table 2 for a frequency table of the classification of the RC/EZ/ECs by political structure.

*Control variables.* I include demographic controls from Census data, such as percentage construction and farm employment from the 1990 Economic Census; the total population (in 10,000 units); and the change in total population (2000-1990). A dummy variable for being an RC is included because RCs have different selection criteria and reporting requirements from EZ/ECs. A dummy for EZs is included to distinguish from the reference category ECs, because ECs received fewer benefits.¹⁶

**Analysis**

Descriptive statistics, correlations, and multicollinearity diagnostics are used to screen variables and test model assumptions. Due to the small sample size and large set of variables to include, Bayesian Model Averaging is used to further screen variables for a final model. BMA outperforms stepwise methods for exploratory research and accounts for bias related to testing multiple models (Steyerberg 2009). BMA calculates a diagnostic called posterior probability (p!=0) for each variable included in the model (i.e., what is the probability this variable has an effect on the outcome?). BMA also calculates the expected value of the odds ratio of all possible models. Variables of interest and those with 50% or higher posterior probability of selection are included in the final model, which is estimated using logistic regression and tested for spatial...
autocorrelation (Bivand et al. 2008). The AIC, BIC and percentage correct predictions are standard goodness of fit diagnostic for logistic models.

Following the multivariate analysis, I provide some contextual information about RC/EZ/ECs that had immigrant-related projects (or not) by majority racial or ethnic group (Hispanic, White, Black). In addition to information found in implementation plans and annual reports submitted to HUD, I reviewed local newspaper articles and other web-based sources of information about the communities in question. I also drew from pilot study data that included 10 stakeholder telephone interviews and a field visit to the Minneapolis, MN EZ/EC in 2008. The purpose of the information on the research context is to assess the plausibility of the role of relative group size and bureaucratic incorporation in the implementation of immigrant-related projects to inform future policy and implementation of place-based initiatives.

[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]

**Results**

**Descriptive Statistics**

See Table 2 for descriptive statistics. The these sample areas are predominantly African-American and declining in population. The percent foreign-born in the sample increased by 3.23% from 1990 to 2000. The average immigrant concentration is 1.24 in 1990 and ranges from 0.02 (East St. Louis, IL EC) to 4.79, (Des Moines, IA, EC). See Table 3 for the number and frequency of immigrant, Hispanic, Asian, and African-American enclaves. Most RC/EZ/ECs contain an African-American enclave (n = 113) followed by those with Hispanic enclaves (n = 94). As expected, a greater share of the Hispanic Enclaves contained immigrant-related projects. Only one RC/EZ/EC was dissolved, i.e., devoid of an enclave (Albany, GA), and it had no immigrant-related projects.
Multivariate Results

Table 3 contains a full model of variables that survived multicollinearity screening and a final model that includes the variables of interest and those that have greater than 50% posterior probability of being selected according to BMA. There is no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the final model (Moran's I = 0.209, p = 0.413). As expected in our hypothesis for research question one, the potential presence of spatial concentration of certain ethnic groups is associated with having an immigrant-related project. For example, Hispanic Enclaves have 1.50 odds greater that an RC/EZ/EC included an immigrant-related project, holding other variables constant. In contrast, African-American “Enclaves” have .10 odds lower of that an RC/EZ/EC included an immigrant-related project, holding other variables constant. In terms of labor-market changes, for every one-percentage-point change in the foreign-born from 1990 to 2000, there is a 1.54 increase in odds that an RC/EZ/EC included an immigrant-related project. The data show that RC/EZ/EC with a spatial concentration of Hispanics relative to the metro area as well as areas with increasing immigration have immigrant-related project.

My hypothesis regarding research question two also finds support in the data. Multiracial RC/EZ/ECs have .17 odds lower than Bifurcated Hispanic RC/EZ/ECs for including an immigrant-related project, holding other variables constant. Homogenously Black RC/EZ/ECs have .15 odds lower than Bifurcated Hispanic RC/EZ/ECs for including an immigrant-related project, holding other variables constant. The number of ethnic and immigrant organizations and Homogenously Hispanic RC/EZ/ECs had a positive coefficient, but it was not statistically significant. Conversely, Homogenously White had lower odds, but was not statistically significant. The data show that bifurcated Hispanic areas had greater odds of pro-immigrant
implementation that homogenous and multiracial areas.

As evidence of model fit, the final model correctly predicted 83.46% of the cases. All 10 false positives are mixed enclaves (both Black and Hispanic). All are increasing in percent foreign born, and all but two have a Democratic Congressional Representative. All 11 of the false negatives have Black enclaves, and all but three Homogenously Black. However, nine are mixed enclaves--mostly Black and Hispanic. They are all increasing in percent foreign born, but declining in population except two. The next section will examine examples of immigrant-related projects and programs from RC/EZ/ECs. In order to give some context to these types, some brief descriptions of some of the statistically significant combination follow.

**Examples of Immigrant-Related Projects by Spatial Configuration**

**Black & Hispanic Mixed Enclave - Bifurcated Hispanic**

As per definition, the Cumberland County, NJ EZ is bifurcated and about evenly split Black and Hispanic, but these areas are not contiguous. The EZ is comprised of four small urban jurisdictions in southern New Jersey: Commerce Township, Bridgeton, Millville, and Vineland in southern New Jersey. The Board of the Cumberland County EZ reflects this Bifurcation. For example, the mayor of Bridgeton, for example, is African-American and the mayors of Vineland and Millville are Hispanic (Cumberland Empowerment Zone, 2016). The foreign-born population increased from 3.19% 1990 to 10.75% in 2000. Two implementation plans in HUD’s reporting system included specific outreach to Hispanic populations. First, the EZ Summer Youth Enrichment Program helped provide transportation for youth who qualified for the Work Opportunity Tax Credit to work at Wawa, a regional convenience store. Second, the Urban Network Organization (UNO), a Hispanic community based organization, was funded to perform capacity building activities. The EZ also used its bond financing for several
manufacturing and warehouse facilities. This is a straightforward example of an interethnic coalition formally enacted by it’s board membership.

**African-American “Enclave” – Homogenous Black**

On the other hand, the Chattanooga, TN RC deviated from the multivariate model in that the model predicted that it should not have an immigrant-related project. It was a homogenous African-American neighborhood that arguably recruited immigrants. Specifically, in 1990 it had the lowest percentage foreign-born in the entire sample and one of the highest relative group size scores of 90%. Chattanooga developed one of the most proactive and nationally recognized efforts to incorporate immigrants at the local level (Gambetta, Gedrimaite, and Durana 2010). Since 1984, the Lyndhurst Foundation supported Chattanooga’s structured community visioning process regarding the waterfront and downtown development (Kubisch et al. 2010; Littlefield 2008). This process connected “the little lady at church and the millionaire” (Participant 8, personal communication, July 2008). The award of the RC designation in 2001 continued the tradition of community participation at a time when middle class African-American residents were returning from the suburbs and new Latino immigrants, primarily Guatemalans, were arriving (Participant 8, personal communication, July 2008). The City of Chattanooga facilitated the incorporation of local immigrants by inviting the Guatemalan Consulate to provide national ID cards in Chattanooga. Various ethnic, Latino, civic and religious associations in turn assisted newcomers in obtaining proper identification needed to acquire work authorization and services from state and federal agencies. Support also included a small business club for Latino entrepreneurs. This Chattanooga–Guatemalan connection in the RC led the Bush administration to organize representatives from the City of Chattanooga and community-based organizations to go to Guatemala to launch the “Guatemalan Opportunity Zone” (Littlefield 2008). In this one
case, bureaucratic incorporation is a plausible explanation for immigrant-related projects. The population had very few immigrants or Hispanics to form a voting coalition, yet clearly the local government had been engaging in broad inclusive community participation for over two decades.

**Hispanic Enclave – Homogenous Hispanic**

RC/EZ/ECs with a Hispanic majority had higher odds of having an immigrant-related plan. Indeed, all Hispanic majority RC/EZ/ECs had one except one. One example of planning for immigrants in a majority Hispanic RC was the Lawrence, MA RC, located in the Merrimack Valley outside of Boston, MA. Latinos came to this region in part because of the low-wage job mix available in food processing in the Metro Boston region (Participant 2, personal communication, June 2008). Planners in the Merrimack Valley developed a long-term educational strategy for Latino youth because the migration patterns of the families reduced educational outcomes, whereas recent immigration raids put young citizens in mixed-status families at risk of homelessness. Furthermore, in one city in the Merrimack Valley, Lawrence, Massachusetts, the economic development professional working with the RC program moved there because it had artist and immigrant enclaves similar to the ones New York had when she was growing up. Indeed, the Lawrence RC had experienced a 7.04% point increase in its foreign-born population. For her, it was natural to plan for immigration and be a broker because immigrants were already an important part of the neighborhood and civic identity (Participant 1, personal communication, June 2008). Indeed, Kubish, Auspos, Brown, and Dewar (2010) highlight Lawrence, MA as having a model of community building for its theoretically informed approach to civic engagement with family networks to achieve neighborhood change. Although these programs in Lawrence sound like a plausible example of immigrant bureaucratic incorporation, this area is one of immigrant concentration and Hispanic concentration, so it
would be bureaucratic incorporation aligned with potential political power.

**Many Enclaves - White Majority – Multiracial**

The model correctly predicted the Minneapolis EZ/EC and St. Paul EC, in part because the percentage point increase in foreign-born in the EZ had been 12.18%, far above the average for the sample. Although they have white majorities, they also contain several enclaves with a robust set of immigrant-related projects. For example, the Asian enclave in the St. Paul EC originated during the refugee resettlement of the 1970s, in particular the Hmong people from Laos. Refugees who lived in Minneapolis asked the Hmong community in St. Paul to develop a neighborhood on their side of the river (Participant 6, personal communication, June 2008). The Broadway Street Empowerment Zone in the Minneapolis EZ was developed in partnership with the Hmong Mutual Assistance Association (HMAA) (Participant 6, personal communication, June 2008). Broadway was predominately African-American and home to a HUD HOPE VI public housing deconcentration project to renovate aging public housing stock and replace it with a mixed use, mixed tenure and mixed income property. The City of Minneapolis put a Hmong project manager in charge of the HOPE VI redevelopment in the EZ (FN MN4). Other projects included Central Mercado, a Latino retail business cooperative, and the Global Market, a retail space that featured African and Asian refugee businesses. In this EZ/EC, outmigration of African-Americans may have opened up opportunity for the immigrant population by shifting the relative political clout. Despite evidence of economic and political incorporation, this is also a plausible example of bureaucratic incorporation in that the local government hired an immigrant to manage a public sector redevelopment in an immigrant neighborhood inside the EZ/EC and included representatives of a refugee community on the EZ/EC advisory board. This bureaucratic incorporation happened in the presence of a solid white majority, as one would expect from a
multiracial progressive coalition.

**Multiracial - Black Majority**

Not only was the Boston EZ majority Black, it also had a high Hispanic concentration and a Chinatown. The Boston Empowerment Zone emphasized entrepreneurship. While marketing tax incentives to immigrants, an economic development professional observed that “mom-and-pop businesses only hire mom-and-pop” (Participant 7, personal communication, July 2008). The Boston EZ organized outreach in Chinatown to deliver information about the tax incentives. Most of the interest came from Asian-American–owned banks because their management saw that it was in the banks’ interest to communicate this information to their customers. The RC/EZ wage credit was not relevant to most family-owned immigrant businesses because immediate family were eligible employees. To respond to this dilemma, some wage-credit processing consultants recommended that family-owned businesses "exchange cousins" in order to have eligible employees (Participant 7, personal communication 7, July 2008). During the period when the Boston EZ had projects in the Chinatown, like Lawrence, it had an increase in foreign-born. Although the multivariate model correctly predicts Boston EZ, it is interesting the specific attention to Asian immigrants and not Hispanic. This could suggest an interethnic coalition as well as bureaucratic incorporation.

**Discussion and Conclusion:**

**Immigration and the Future of Place-Based Initiatives**

This study adds to the literature on place-based initiatives by showing that almost all RC/EZ/ECs included enclaves in the designated area. Indeed, only one RC/EZ/EC in the sample
did not contain an ethnic enclave and had a diffuse structure. Having a Hispanic enclave increased the odds, but having an African American “enclave” decreased the odds of having an immigrant-related plan. This finding is consistent with Marrow (2008). This study also adds to the literature on bifurcation and builds on the findings of Filomeno (2016) and Good (2005). Bifurcated Hispanic RC/EZ/ECs have greater odds of having an immigrant-related plan than multiracial or homogenously Black RC/EZ/ECs. These findings are dissimilar to the work of Tolbert & Hero (1996), who found evidence that Bifurcation led to a group threat and passage of an anti-immigrant law. It is possible that the difference can be explained by different geography and timing of the RC/EZ/EC programs. It is also possible that implementation of a Federal program is less salient to local voters than it is to local government elected officials and the bureaucrats that work for them.

Although the RC/EZ/EC programs were place-based initiatives, given the change in immigrant population, we could also understand the RC/EZ/EC as a mobility program, in terms of mobility into the RC/EZ/EC from another place, and perhaps socioeconomic mobility within the RC/EZ/EC. Indeed, local governments not only developed plans around existing enclaves, Hispanic ones in particular, but also worked to support new immigrants in places like Chattanooga. In addition to relative group size, is also plausible that bureaucratic incorporation in local government is part of the mechanism for inclusion of an immigrant-related project. This Some of the case studies also demonstrates the plausibility of bureaucratic immigrant incorporation. This is important because place-based initiatives involve professionally trained bureaucrats who have substantial discretion regarding implementation of public programs.

This study has several limitations related to the sample, complexity of the RC/EZ/EC programs, volume of reporting material, and generic limitations of census data. First, it did not
control for selection bias, so I do not make any causal claims. Because RC/EZ/ECs applicants were required to involve the community broadly, but did not require any specific racial or ethnic participation, it is unclear how the designation selection process would have influenced the choice by the local government to engage immigrants in the community other than to say that if a concentration of immigrants lived in the proposed designated geographic area, it is reasonable to expect that the local government engaged them.

Second, annual reports and plans only capture some of the information needed to make a judgment about having immigrant-related projects. There is no efficient, systematic way to know at this time precisely which projects and programs were initiated by community members, or by elected officials or bureaucrats. Only an in-depth methodology using participant observation during the planning process could have distinguished “genuine” immigrant participation and outreach from the tokenistic (e.g. Chaskin, Dávila, Gittell). Third, many designations started as ECs and became EZs or RCs over time, requiring difficult choices about which to treat as separate and which to treat as the same. Fourth, Census data from the NCDB have certain limitations. Using the majority racial and ethnic groups does not capture actual conflict or coalitions between specific populations. It is intended as a global measure of the relative size of one heterogeneous population compared to another heterogeneous population. Fifth, the ideal study would be able to distinguish nativity from race and ethnicity but the NCDB does not disaggregate the population this way.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study contributes to the literature by showing that population characteristics of these place-based initiatives were associated with having an immigrant-related project. The sample includes examples of local government planners who promoted efforts to revitalize the inner city through immigrant entrepreneurship. Future place-
based initiatives could be targeted with better information about changing population dynamics of inner cities and develop procedures to address relative group size so all members of the community are heard. Finally, the values of community participation and resident benefit should remain central in place-based initiatives.

References


### Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample (n = 127)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>.89</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
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<td>African American Concentration 1990</td>
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<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic Concentration 1990</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<td>3.73</td>
<td>-2.55</td>
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<tr>
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<td>49.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>%White Majority 1990</td>
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<td>%Hispanic Majority 1990</td>
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<td>% Renewal Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Empowerment Zone</td>
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<td>44.45</td>
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Table 2: Number and Percentage of Renewal Communities, Empowerment Zones, and Enterprise Communities that Have an Immigrant-Related Project by Enclave Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Enclave Type</th>
<th>Immigrant-Related Plan = No</th>
<th>Immigrant-Related Plan = Yes</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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<tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>94</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>56</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Non-White Native Born Enclave</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>126</td>
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<td>Mixed</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>Bifurcated Hispanic &amp; (Black or White)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiracial</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (Rows not Mutually Exclusive)</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>127</td>
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Table 3: Bayesian Logistic Regression Model Estimating Log Odds that an RC/EZ/EC Included an Immigrant-Related Project (n = 127).

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<th></th>
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<td>1.54</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>1.11</td>
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<td>.43</td>
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**Enclave Variables**

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<td>.74</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.72</td>
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<td>African-American “Enclave”</td>
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<td>1.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-2.32</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.03*</td>
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<td>Hispanic Enclave</td>
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<td>1.33</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.03*</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Change foreign-born 90-00</td>
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<td>.39</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.00*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic Immigrant Organization Density</td>
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<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>78.3</td>
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**Political Variables**

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>p!=0</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>Est.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bifurcation Type (ref Bifurcated Hispanic)</td>
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<td>Multiracial</td>
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<td>.98</td>
<td>.04*</td>
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<td>.89</td>
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<td>Bifurcated Other</td>
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<td>Homogenous Black</td>
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<td>Homogenous Hispanic</td>
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<td>5.92</td>
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<td>Homogenous White</td>
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<td>Democratic Congressional Representative</td>
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**Control Variables**

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<th>OR</th>
<th>Est.</th>
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<td>Population per 10,000</td>
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<td>.61</td>
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<td>% Point Change in Population 80-90</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<td>Is Renewal Community (1=Yes; 0=No)</td>
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<td>-.66</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>Is Empowerment Zone (1=Yes;0=No)</td>
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<td>.37</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)    | 113.35 | 104.65 |
| Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)    | 158.85 | 133.09 |
| % Correct Predictions                   | 87.40% | 83.46% |

Note 1: * statistically significant at p < 0.05; OR = Odds Ratio; Est. = logit; S.E. = Standard error, p =p-value; p!=0 is the posterior probability of being selected in a model using BIC (e.g., 100% means that the variable is significant in all models).
Footnotes

1 An immigrant is typically defined in the U.S. as a person who moves from one country to another permanently and is also considered foreign-born. However, a child born abroad to expatriate parents is not considered an immigrant (e.g. Senator John McCain). My study uses U.S. Census data that distinguishes foreign-born persons from those born abroad to U.S. citizens. I discuss outreach to "immigrants" or "immigrant communities" by local governments that may include second- (e.g. children of immigrants) and third-generation immigrants consistent with the use of the term "ethnic" in the cited immigration literature (see footnote 2).

2 "Ethnicity" refers to the structures that hold together an ethnic group. An ethnic group has members who are aware of group membership and have a common culture (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990) distinct from that of mainstream Anglo-American whites. Many immigrants therefore are part of an "ethnic" group, but not all "ethnic" Americans are immigrants.

3 Both Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Zone will be abbreviated EZ for simplicity's sake.

4 The original six were Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia/Camden, and New York. Some scholars treat Philadelphia and Camden as separate designations in a regression model because they have different state-level fixed effects. HUD designated Cleveland and Los Angeles administratively as "supplemental empowerment zones," which Congress later designated by statute to extend the tax incentives to those areas.

5 Some local governments sharing a designation are treated separately if the Census data and reporting could be disaggregated (e.g. Philadelphia and Camden; Schenectady, NY EC from Albany/Troy, EC; East St. Louis EZ from the St. Louis EZ). I dropped seven county-level rural RCs and one Tribal RC designation because the unit of analysis would not be one or more municipalities. I included "rural" RCs that consisted of tracts inside of municipalities (Burlington, VT; Jamestown, NY; Orange Cove, CA; Parlier, CA). For the purposes of this paper, there are 66 Round I ECs, 7 Round I EZs, 16 Round II EZs, 8 Round III EZs, 32 RCs, the Washington, DC EZ; and the Los Angeles EZ. The Cleveland EZ/EC is counted as one designation and included in the Round I EC subtotal.

6 Ideally, these data would be all available at the tract level, but they are not. Furthermore, data from the NCCS derive from tax filings, do not encompass all organizations, and are subject to self-report error. As such, I assume that the coefficient estimate of this variable will be biased downwards and subject to a false negative. For a good critique of NCCS data see Gleenon and Bloemraad (2011).

7 The HUD PERMS system has reports available beginning in 1998 through the end of designation (e.g. 2009 for RCs, 2014 for EZs, 2004 for ECs). For consistency, I used 2006 as the last year because all designations had reported on their projects and programs by that time and few reported afterwards.

8 I coded outreach to Latinos and Hispanics unless the organization’s web site or Guidestar profile had language to imply that the primary clientele consisted of native-born. Likewise, with the word African, I made a contextual judgment as to whether the plan was referencing African-Americans or African immigrants. For both, I assumed language training or serving newcomers as evidence of immigration.

9 NCCS classifies these as "Organizations that provide or coordinate a wide variety of programs and services that are structured to meet the social, educational, economic, recreational and other needs of specific ethnic and/or immigrant groups in ways that are culturally appropriate."

10 By majority, I mean the ethnic group with the largest population (i.e., plurality). It is not possible to use a 51% majority because there are 15 without a majority. This variable was simplified at request of anonymous reviewers. In previous drafts, I used the % Black – (%Hispanic + %Asian), and % White – (%Hispanic + % Asian). I did not use ratios, in contrast to O’Neil (2010), because ratios are unbounded at the tails. In contrast to Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010), I did not use percentage poor by race or ethnicity because that variable was not significant in their study, and furthermore, these RC/EZ/EC tracts are exclusively in high-poverty areas.

11 I dropped poverty, unemployment, and region dummies because they were collinear. A dummy for EZs was included at the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer. Given the small sample size, it is not possible to include a dummy for each EZ/EC round. Also at the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, I dropped metropolitan area, industry-mix control variables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1990, 1994, 1998, 2000 to match year of designation). Anonymous reviewers argued that metropolitan-wide data did not fit the RC/EZ/EC. These variables followed Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010), who include the percentage of jobs in agriculture and construction because they rely on immigrant labor. The percentage of farm and construction jobs was significant in a previous
draft, but Hispanic concentration was not.

17 Models run using bic.reg in the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) package in R, glm, and spdep.

18 Systematic sampling was not possible by 2008 because many RC/EZ/ECs no longer had staff members knowledgeable about the origins of the programs. For more information about sampling see [REMOVED FOR BLIND REVIEW].

19 San Diego, CA upgraded from EC to RC. The RC’s limited reporting requirements may explain the absence of an immigrant-related project. The San Diego EC supported refugee microcredit programs (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013).

20 The Asian Concentration (1.94) was below the threshold despite an identified Chinatown.