Contemporary regulatory programs challenge the traditional assumption that government is the central regulatory actor, as these programs increasingly rely on monitoring and sanctioning through organizations outside of the public sector.  This paper explores differences in the attributes, actions, and regulatory approaches of third-party monitors in the administration of the USDA’s National Organic Program (NOP).  The NOP establishes national standards for foods marketed as “organic” in the U.S., relying on third-party monitors from across the public, nonprofit, and private sectors to certify and inspect operations for compliance with NOP regulations.  Drawing on regulatory compliance literature, publicness and sectoral differences theories, and theories of public servant role perception, factors that influence behavioral differences are identified.  Qualitative data is systematically analyzed and integrated from in-depth interviews with regulatory administrators from 20 third-party monitors out of the 49 U.S. based NOP accredited regulatory organizations and ten purposively selected organic regulation actors.  Results indicate that third-party monitors operating in a competitive environment negotiate the tension between two sometimes competing functions – those of a regulatory agent and a paid service provider.   The additional constraints placed on public organizations appear to limit managerial discretion, reducing organizational capacity, and encouraging a more stringent interpretation of regulations.  The analysis suggests, however, that regulator role perceptions and resulting regulatory behavior are influenced by the organic certification market environment, composed of cross-sector regulatory organizations competing for regulatee clients.