Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

In the context of Representative Bureaucracy, studies have tested extensively the association between passive and active representation. Passive representation refers to how the demographic composition of the bureaucratic workforce reflects the demographic distribution of the general population. Active representation, on the other hand, accounts for how minority bureaucrats’ actions may result in better policy outcomes for the minority populations they serve. In theory, the translation of passive into active representation is mediated by some level of administrative discretion. Minority representatives can advocate actively for the population they represent, if they have the discretion to do so in the administrative context. In this sense, the presence of administrative discretion is the most important assumption in the active Representative Bureaucracy literature. However, very few studies test the association between passive and active representation, while most explicitly assume it. Recent attempts to quantify levels of discretion have observed it indirectly, as a reflection of levels and span of control, but no quantitative studies have explored its true nature yet.  

Based on an extensive literature review on the role of discretion in the Representative Bureaucracy literature, we develop a conceptual framework to identify the components of bureaucratic discretion.
The framework will provide a theoretical argument on the nature of bureaucratic discretion, how it allows the translation of passive into active representation, and constrains its exercise. 

The literature on representative bureaucracy shows that street-level bureaucrats face three sets of tensions when exercising discretion: one derived from administrative constraints, one arising from the demands of the population served, and a final one defined by beliefs held by the bureaucrats, their profession and its culture. While these three forces influence street-level workers’ decision-making processes, empirical studies have focused mainly on the first one. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) argue that while administrative discretion is an important assumption, it is not the only force influencing discretionary decisions of street-level bureaucrats. These authors describe the state-agent and citizen-agent narratives.  The state-agent narrative describes how street-level workers apply the rule of law and administrative process to the cases they handle. The other, citizens-agent narrative, opens the opportunity to analyze street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making processes beyond administrative control. Here discretion is framed by street-level workers’ beliefs and their assessment of their clients’ moral character. This second narrative accounts for a different aspect of discretion that has been neglected in empirical studies so far.

We build on this characterization to expand our understanding of street-level bureaucrats’ discretionary decision-making. We argue that three types of discretion mediate the translation of passive to active representation – administrative constraints, characteristics of service population, and individual bureaucratic beliefs - and that these are influenced by contextual factors beyond the street-level worker’s control.  Our conceptual framework sets the basis to fill the gap in this literature to inform the design of a quantitative metric of bureaucratic discretion.