Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Constitutionally-mandated presidential term limits have been enshrined in the majority of democratic constitutions in low- and middle-income countries in order to prevent the potentially dangerous consolidation of power in fledging or fragile democracies by incumbent regimes with enormous built-in advantages.  These safeguards promote a healthy, rotating, representative government that assures different parties the opportunity to state their case and a legitimate chance to have their turn in power.  In recent years, there has been a trend toward increasing frequency of presidential term limit violations, particularly among the leaders of Latin American and African countries.  Given this development, it is important to identify factors that are likely to prevent these violations in countries in which they might occur.

This research draws upon a primary dataset of presidential term limit violations in low- and middle-income democracies that I created to evaluate the political and economic effect of these violations.  This dataset sheds lights on the relative frequency of these events and the success of these violations where attempted.  Since 1989, I found 128 total transitions where a president came up against a term limit; in approximately 40% of these cases, term limits were challenged with 66% of these challenges resulting in the president staying in power beyond their constitutionally-appointed term.  Using widely-available political and economic data from Freedom House and the World Bank, I measure the short- and medium-term effects of successful violations on a range of political and economic variables in order to ascertain their effect.  I find a statistically significant correlation between the violation of term limits and the degradation of civil liberties and political rights in these countries.

Using this same database, I examine all cases of successful and unsuccessful presidential term limit violations across a series of key variables, such as independent judiciaries or legislatures, vibrant civil societies, or strong opposition parties, which emerge from the relevant literature.  I use these factors as the main criteria through which to examine all potential cases of term limit violations, employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to identify possible necessary and sufficient conditions to prevent the violation of term limits.

By highlighting the likely factors that lead to the violation of presidential term limits in low- and middle-income democracies, we can inform decisions and priorities for pro-democracy actors seeking to prevent these violations in countries where they are likely to happen and allow them to invest in promoting peaceful, democratic transitions of power.  For domestic actors, the results of this research will pinpoint where scarce resources can best be allocated to protect democratic institutions determined to be most essential, such as independent legislatures, judiciaries, and electoral commissions.  For international actors such as bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, this research can highlight which organizations and pro-democracy actors, such as opposition parties, civil society, or the media, merit sustained support.  By providing international actors with better data and solutions regarding actual and potential term limit violations, they will be better equipped to promote good governance initiatives in their member states and in international fora.