Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

While existing literature has studied the building of regulatory system in China, less attention has been paid to how the competing institutional logics have shaped the operations of regulatory agencies. In this research, I focus on the impacts of two regulatory campaigns on the building of regulatory state in China’s local environmental governance: the environmental inspections campaign and the deregulation reform to reduce regulatory burdens. The Chinese Central Government launched the environmental inspections campaign in 2016. Multiple inspection teams were dispatched by the central government to selected regions to improve local environmental quality. In particular, many factories have been shut down for environmental reviews are happening, and many other factories have to improve their environmental management practices and outcomes. This campaign-style enforcement has significantly strengthened the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. Meanwhile, China has also implemented the deregulation reform to reduce regulatory burdens to business firm by streamlining the governmental procedures, delegating regulatory power, and improving government services. As a response to this reform, local environmental protection bureaus have simplified the environmental law enforcement procedures and environmental impact assessment procedures. Based on interviews with officials affiliated with 12 urban districts in a city of western China, I explored how local environmental protection bureaus are responding to the two competing institutional logics and improve their capacity and performance in environmental governance. This research will contribute to a better understanding about the nature of regulatory state building, and how competing institutional logics may affect this process in China’s environmental governance.