Panel Paper:
Occupational Licensing and Labor Informality: Evidence for Nail Technicians
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
This paper studies the effect of occupational licensing requirements on the informal employment of a particular group of low-skilled workers: nail technicians. The hypothesis is that stricter regulations for obtaining a license give workers a higher incentive to hold an off the book job as a way to avoid the fixed cost of operating in the formal sector.
By exploring state-level variation in the strictness of the regulation to get a nail technician license, the paper analyzes the effect of the regulation on two proxies for informality. The first is the probability that a nail technician claims to be self-employed rather than an employee, using the 2012-2016 5-year American Community Survey (ACS). The second approach to informality is the probability that a nail technician reports not to have a professional license in states that require a license to operate. This second approach uses questions on occupational licensing added to the Current Population Survey (CPS) starting in January 2015.
The paper uses characteristics of the state-level Board of Cosmetology as instruments for the strictness of the regulation measures. Preliminary results show a small bust significant effect of stricter occupational licensing requirements on the probability of nail technician working off the books.