Panel Paper:
Abolishing Environmental Regulation: Strategic Effects and Welfare Implications
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
We consider a polluting industry where, first, the regulator sets an emission fee; second, every firm responds choosing its R&D investment; and, third, every firm selects its output level. In our benchmark setting, we assume that the fee remains into effect with a given probability but is abolished otherwise. We find equilibrium behavior and evaluate social welfare. While welfare under policy uncertainty is higher than in the absence of policy, we show that a potential regulatory rollback yields a welfare loss. To identify the origin of this welfare loss, we consider two counterfactual scenarios. Scenario 1, the regulator assumes that the policy remains into effect, while firms consider that regulation may be rolled back. We show that players’ behavior coincides with that in the benchmark setting. Scenario 2, firms assume that the policy remains into effect, while the regulator does not. By comparing firms’ behavior against that in the benchmark, we can isolate the effect of policy uncertainty on firms’ R&D decisions.
We compare the welfare loss from policy uncertainty against that from abolishing regulation, identifying in which cases the former is larger than the latter. This occurs when: (1) policy is unlikely to remain into effect; (2) several firms compete; (3) pollution causes severe damages; and (4) R&D investment costs are low. Our results indicate that, in industries where (1)-(4) concur, regulators should be careful at suggesting that environmental policies can be revisited in the future.
Full Paper:
- Abolishing_Env_Reg_.pdf (259.7KB)