Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Researchers consistently demonstrate that urban schools serving a high proportion of disadvantaged student subgroups (e.g. racial minorities, socioeconomically disadvantaged, low performing) face enormous challenges in attracting and retaining experienced, high-quality, effective teachers (e.g. Adamnson & Darling-Hammond, 2012; Jacob, 2007; Peske & Haycock, 2006). This research generally finds that the least credentialed, experienced, and effective teachers are concentrated in poor, minority, and low performing schools (e.g. Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Feng, 2010; Glazerman & Max, 2011).

One of the challenges in improving the distribution of quality teachers is that teaching assignments are strongly correlated with teacher preferences (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivikin, 2004; Scafidi, Sjoquist, & Stinebrickner, 2007). Additionally, teacher transfer policies found in teacher collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) often grant teachers direct selection of their teaching assignment according to these preferences, with the most senior teachers getting first selection of positions. To the extent that teachers prefer teaching in higher performing, more advantage schools, experienced teachers may utilize seniority-based transfer provisions to self-select into these locations, leaving the lowest performing, most disadvantaged schools with the least experienced teachers.

This paper takes up the issue of seniority-based teacher transfer policies using data from a unique dataset of CBAs from Michigan school districts over two successive bargaining negotiations before and after the enactment of Michigan Public Act 103 (2011). The act prohibited unions and school districts from negotiating over “the placement of teachers,” meaning that administrators were given full latitude over teacher assignments. However, approximately 60 percent of district CBAs afforded administrators discretion over teacher assignments even before the legislature enacted the law (we call these “Right-to-Assign” (RTA) Districts). To estimate the effect of the law change (or the removal of seniority-based teacher transfer and assignment provisions from CBAs) on teacher mobility, we use comparative interrupted time series (CITS) models to compare transfer rates between teachers in treated “seniority” districts (those impacted by PA 103 because they used seniority as a factor in transfer decisions pre-reform), and RTA districts (those with agreements already aligned with PA 103). Specifically, we ask: Did the removal of seniority-based transfer provisions from Michigan CBAs affect within-district transfer rates of teachers and do these effects vary based on teacher experience and school disadvantage?

We find that both experienced and novice teachers are significantly less likely to experience a within-district transfer after the enactment of PA 103. In comparing seniority districts to RTA districts, we find that the removal of involuntary or voluntary seniority-based transfer provisions from CBAs (in treatment districts) did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of experienced teachers transferring into disadvantaged schools. We show evidence that the distribution of experienced teachers to disadvantaged schools is becoming less equitable over time in Michigan and conclude that the removal of seniority-based transfer provisions from CBAs had little effect. A series of 25 follow-up qualitative interviews with union and district leaders suggests that although school district administrators removed the transfer language from their CBAs, teacher transfer practices changed very little after the law went into effect.