Association for Public Policy Analysis & Management

Globally, there is growing interest among scholars and practitioners in understanding whether and how jurisdictions are able to achieve energy transitions – a migration away from carbon-intensive fossil fuels and a shift to renewable and low-carbon sources of electricity. But too often studies focus on policy instruments explicitly designed to promote clean energy – such as Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) policies, energy efficiency resource standards, or feed-in tariffs – with limited attention to the underlying institutional environments, regulatory and market processes that shape whether and how clean energy outcomes are achieved. For example, while a household may pay a single electricity bill, that bill reflects electricity markets in that region; state RPS obligations; utility distribution charges, which are regulated by state PUCs; and transmission costs, which are a function of regional transmission organizations. Each of these components of electricity provision has an effect on clean energy outcomes; and these components are shaped by policy venues that may share overlapping jurisdictions or policy actors, or that may be connected by adjacent processes, in which outputs of one policy venue – such as rules, plans, or prices – are critical inputs that shape interactions in connected policy venues.

This paper asks: how do multiple, overlapping markets and policy venues shape utility consumers’ consumption of clean energy? My analysis focuses on a single state – Connecticut – that has adopted ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals for the electricity sector and is currently in the process of “transitioning” away from carbon-intensive electricity sources. At the same time, Connecticut exemplifies the current approach to electricity governance, where an array of overlapping and adjacent policy venues shape utilities’ procurement decisions. The dependent variable for this analysis is the energy mix that the state’s main utility, United Illuminating (UI), procures and delivers to consumers. The independent variables are the overlapping and adjacent policy venues that shape UI’s procurement decisions, including electricity markets; regulatory venues in which utility planning, RPS compliance, and rate regulation takes place; collaborative venues in which demand-side planning occurs; and regional transmission organizations that make region-wide investments in transmission infrastructure.

Methodologically, I use a qualitative approach that synthesizes Lubell’s (2013) ecology of games framework with more traditional methods of institutional analysis (Ostrom 2011). I use an original dataset that includes interviews with regulators, utility providers, nonprofits, and government agencies; archived statutes and regulations; PUC regulatory decisions and proceedings, minutes of collaborative or cooperative decision making bodies; and rules and minutes of regional transmission organizations. Statutes and regulations are used to identify the policy venues that shape that comprise electric sector governance, as well as the actors involved, the rules that shape interactions, and the decisions, outputs, or outcomes that are produced as a result. I then draw on interviews and archived regulatory orders to identify overlap and adjacency across policy venues, and to analyze the way that these overlapping and adjacent policy venues combine to shape Connecticut’s clean energy policies and utility procurement decisions, producing an energy mix that is delivered to consumers.