Poster Paper:
Green Certification Pathways: The Roles of Public Goods, Private Goods, and Certification Schemes
Friday, November 3, 2017
Regency Ballroom (Hyatt Regency Chicago)
*Names in bold indicate Presenter
This dissertation examines evidence on the effectiveness of voluntary certification
programs in the built environment. Drawing on unique data from buildings certified under
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) label, the technologies
adopted toward certification are examined. Analysis reveals strengths and weaknesses of
the program design, including apparent promotion of energy and water efficiency, but
limited promotion of public good provision. These findings motivate extensive theoretical
development around the valuation of environmental products: traditional economic
signaling perspectives are argued to be of little value in understanding “noisy” signals of
environmental quality. Drawing on perspectives from organizational theory and strategic
management, a framework for noisy signals is developed, and applied to three empirical
questions. First, the extent to which noisy signals are strategically adopted is examined by
assessing patterns in technology adoption toward green building certification. Second, the
evolving distribution of LEED scores is assessed against a dynamic imputed counterfactual
to reveal the extent to which the certification fosters a “Race to the Top.” Here, signaling
and learning are posited as a mechanism for such a “Race,” in a critique of past theory.
Finally, the shift in practices contributing from public goods to private gains is evaluated
over time, calling to question how we should measure the success of environmental
programs which aim to promote improvements with regard to myriad concerns. In sum,
this work contributes to our understanding of corporate sustainability, certification
programs, signaling theory, and technology learning.
programs in the built environment. Drawing on unique data from buildings certified under
the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) label, the technologies
adopted toward certification are examined. Analysis reveals strengths and weaknesses of
the program design, including apparent promotion of energy and water efficiency, but
limited promotion of public good provision. These findings motivate extensive theoretical
development around the valuation of environmental products: traditional economic
signaling perspectives are argued to be of little value in understanding “noisy” signals of
environmental quality. Drawing on perspectives from organizational theory and strategic
management, a framework for noisy signals is developed, and applied to three empirical
questions. First, the extent to which noisy signals are strategically adopted is examined by
assessing patterns in technology adoption toward green building certification. Second, the
evolving distribution of LEED scores is assessed against a dynamic imputed counterfactual
to reveal the extent to which the certification fosters a “Race to the Top.” Here, signaling
and learning are posited as a mechanism for such a “Race,” in a critique of past theory.
Finally, the shift in practices contributing from public goods to private gains is evaluated
over time, calling to question how we should measure the success of environmental
programs which aim to promote improvements with regard to myriad concerns. In sum,
this work contributes to our understanding of corporate sustainability, certification
programs, signaling theory, and technology learning.
